The Jehovah’s Witnesses Flag Cases (Part Two)

March 16, 2020June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

I’ve started putting together information and drafts for something which may or may not be titled “Have To” History: A Wall of Separation (Public School Edition). Call me wacky, but I find this stuff fascinating.

Below and in Part One, I’m sharing the drafts of two of earliest cases likely to be included. Both involve little children not saying the Pledge of Allegiance because they believed it violated the Word of God to do so. Both cases were pursued as “freedom of religion” issues, but both were resolved on “free speech” grounds more than anything “wall of separation”-ish. In the second, the Court completely reversed itself only three years after the first – so that was unexpected.

Recap of the Story So Far…

Jehovah’s Witnesses took (and take) literally the Bible’s exhortation to “have no other gods before me.” After experiencing persecution in Germany for not pledging their allegiance to the Fuhrer, leaders of the Witnesses discouraged saluting or reciting oaths to any national symbol – including the American flag. Many public schools in the U.S. required students to salute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance, hoping this would foster patriotism and a sense of civic duty and community in the youth. When young Jehovah’s Witnesses refused, they were punished with expulsion.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses insisted this was a violation of religious liberty. In 1940, the Supreme Court disagreed. “Sorry this offends your beliefs,” the Court ruled, “but national unity is a valid goal of schooling and the law didn’t target your people on purpose.” (I’m paraphrasing.)

Part Two: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), harassment and violence towards Jehovah’s Witnesses surged dramatically across the United States. Many felt validated and encouraged by the Court’s decision, which in their mind had essentially prioritized loyalty and being a good American over freedom of religion, speech, or association. It didn’t help that the U.S. entered World War II shortly thereafter, making patriotism and loyalty towards one’s nation and the flag representing it even more essential in the minds of many and any deviance not merely suspect, but dangerous.

Only a few decades before Gobitis was the first “Red Scare,” in which all things foreign or strange were suspected of undermining the American way of life and required hostile, or even violent response. A decade after the Court’s reversal in Barnette, Congress would launch hearings into the “Communist infiltration” of government, publishing, and the entertainment industry, resulting in hundreds – possibly thousands – of loyal citizens losing their livelihoods and enduring ostracism by friends and neighbors.

In other words, being the “other” in the 20th century wasn’t simply a matter of some suspicious looks or hostile tweets. It meant you weren’t safe just going about your business, no matter how hard you worked, how many taxes you paid, or how devoted you were to your faith and your family. The Jehovah’s Witnesses weren’t Communists, of course – but they were weird and often unpleasant. So… close enough.

A Free, Public Re-Education

Perhaps not surprisingly, persecution only strengthened the resolve of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Their kids still to have other gods before the Big One. It was a mere three years before almost the exact same case as Gobitis came before the High Court once again. This time, the results would be a tiny bit different.

Following the Court’s decision in Gobitis, West Virginia and other states upped their citizenship game and began requiring more intensive public school courses in history, civics, and Constitutional studies. They wanted there to be no doubt about the meaning of traditional American values, like “recite what we tell you and salute the symbols we choose or pay the price!” The West Virginia Board of Education issued a statewide resolution requiring the Pledge and flag salutes at all public school events; refusal to participate would be considered “insubordination” and dealt with harshly. The statute quoted extensively from the Majority Opinion in Gobitis by way of justification.

So… Ouch.

West Virginia and other states did allow some modification of the stiff-arm salute now associated with the Nazi Party. (Presumably, it was OK to behave like fascists as long as one used a slightly different arm motion while so doing.) They also tweaked the rules concerning expulsion. Children not saluting the flag and saying the Pledge would be sent home, after which parents would be prosecuted for not having them in school.

Think what you like about mandatory oaths of fealty, this is a nice touch, statutorily-speaking. It rubs salt into the stripes on their backs, but in a “What? We’re just trying to help!” kind-of-way.

Marie and Gathie Barnette were Jehovah’s Witnesses who quietly refused to swear allegiance to anyone or anything other than the Lord their God. They were expelled, and once again the Witnesses began legal proceedings, despite the Court’s decision only a few years before.

Cases like the Barnettes’s don’t magically appear before the Supreme Court. They’re filed in the appropriate local court first, then potentially appealed up through the hierarchy. Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education (the names are reversed because initially the Barnettes were the plaintiffs) began in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia and was heard by a three-judge panel in 1942.

District Courts are generally expected to follow the precedents set by those up the food chain – the Supreme Court or, lacking clarity from D.C., the closest District Court of Appeals. There are many cases involving issues not specifically addressed by the higher courts, of course, and from time to time you’ll get a rogue judge or two who go against the grain, but normally a case like Barnette would have been fairly straightforward, given its similarity to Gobitis a few short years prior. Clearly the Court would decide for the schools and everyone could go home.

Only they didn’t.

“Ordinarily We Would Feel Constrained…”

In a rather bold move, the three-judge court not only decided in favor of the Barnettes, but made no effort to justify their decision by pretending this case was in some way different than its predecessor. Instead, they simply explained their reasoning based on developments since Gobitis, along with their own interpretation of the law and the Bill of Rights. Taken together, it’s a written opinion as eloquent as anything coming from the Supremes in those days:

Ordinarily we would feel constrained to follow an unreversed decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether we agreed with it or not. It is true that decisions are but evidences of the law and not the law itself; but the decisions of the Supreme Court must be accepted by the lower courts as binding upon them if any orderly administration of justice is to be attained. The developments with respect to the Gobitis case, however, are such that we do not feel that it is incumbent upon us to accept it as binding authority. Of the seven justices now members of the Supreme Court who participated in that decision, four have given public expression to the view that it is unsound, the present Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion rendered therein and three other justices in a special dissenting opinion in Jones v. City of Opelika…
There is, of course, nothing improper in requiring a flag salute in the schools. On the contrary, we regard it as a highly desirable ceremony calculated to inspire in the pupils a proper love of country and reverence for its institutions. And, from our point of view, we see nothing in the salute which could reasonably be held a violation of any of the commandments in the Bible or of any of the duties owing by man to his Maker. But this is not the question before us…
Courts may decide whether the public welfare is jeopardized by acts done or omitted because of religious belief; but they have nothing to do with determining the reasonableness of the belief. That is necessarily a matter of individual conscience. There is hardly a group of religious people to be found in the world who do not hold to beliefs and regard practices as important which seem utterly foolish and lacking in reason to others equally wise and religious; and for the courts to attempt to distinguish between religious beliefs or practices on the ground that they are reasonable or unreasonable would be for them to embark upon a hopeless undertaking and one which would inevitably result in the end of religious liberty.
There is not a religious persecution in history that was not justified in the eyes of those engaging in it on the ground that it was reasonable and right and that the persons whose practices were suppressed were guilty of stubborn folly hurtful to the general welfare…

That last bit echoes Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis. Justice Robert H. Jackson, who will write the Majority Opinion in Barnette, explores the theme from a different angle, but just as clearly.

Nine Justices, One Hundred and Eighty Degrees

The State appealed the case up the ladder (hence the reversal in the order of the names) and the Supreme Court was given an opportunity to try again. This time, they ruled 6 – 3 in favor of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The majority focused less on religious freedom for Jehovah’s Witnesses and more on freedom of speech (or lack thereof) in general. It’s not just that children of certain faiths should be free to respectfully abstain from public recitations of mandatory patriotism, they argued – it was bigger than that. There are certain core liberties which should be protected for everyone, regardless of the specific belief system or point of view involved:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

It was important to the decision that the children’s abstention didn’t interfere with the rights of those around them to go right ahead and say it and wasn’t disruptive in and of itself:

The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin. But the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so.
Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual…

The non-disruptive element matters in this context because “disruption of the learning environment” is often sufficient to allow authorities to restrict behaviors in a school setting which would typically be protected in the larger adult world. (A generation later, the non-disruptive impact of black armbands worn to protest the Vietnam War will be central to the Court’s protection free speech for high school students in Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969.)

In essence, the Court supported the concept of encouraging patriotism and national unity; it rejected the suggestion by the State that the best way to do this was mandatory rituals – especially when they violated the conscience of those involved.

Aftermath

Barnette was a turning point for jurisprudence involving the freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Initially, the first ten Amendments were added to the new Constitution as limits on what the federal government could do or demand of individuals. While state constitutions might offer similar protections for speech, religion, etc., there was no national standard for such things until the first half of the 20th century, when the Court began utilizing the 14th Amendment (ratified just after the Civil War, in 1868) to apply the protections and ideals of the Bill of Rights to the relationship between citizens and state or local government as well.

Even then, the Court often drew a broad distinction between protecting belief and allowing religiously-driven behavior which violated state or local law. This “belief-action doctrine” was most clearly expressed in Reynolds v. United States (1878), a case involving the 19th century’s most vilified religious group, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints –more popularly known as the Mormons.

At issue was the practice of polygamy, and whether or not one’s sincerely held religious convictions could override man’s prohibitions against a practice steeped in history, practiced peacefully among consenting adults, and harming no one. This being the U.S., the answer was inevitable: of course not, because eewwwww!

Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices…
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.

The basic principle still holds – there are laws and expectations ever citizen must heed, regardless of belief system or personal creed. After Barnette, though, sincerely held religious convictions gained substantial ground in terms of what they could or couldn’t be used to justify, both in the world of public education and beyond. Also magnified was the idea that fundamental freedoms like those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights shouldn’t have to wait on legislatures or the next election to find protection – an approach which will be applied to full effect by the Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s.

The Court’s reversal in Barnette didn’t eliminate suspicion or violence towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, but it did at least remove the illusion of federal sanction for such actions, which dropped in both number and severity. America had other things to worry about, and over time the Witnesses started making some effort to be less aggressive and alienating whenever possible to do so without compromising their beliefs.

And in case you’re wondering, they still don’t say pledge their allegiance to anyone’s flag. Nor do they have to.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses Flag Cases (Part One)

March 12, 2020June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

Several years ago, my wife and I moved to northern Indiana from Oklahoma and I started a job at a new school. Day One, first hour, I was about 30 seconds into introducing our opening activity when I was interrupted by announcements via school intercom. “Please stand for the Pledge of Allegiance…”

I wasn’t expecting it, but I figured the routine was pretty much the same everywhere. Hand on heart, I faced the tiny flag hanging in my room and began reciting right along with the tiny anonymous voice on the speaker – “I PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—”

I wasn’t three words in when I realized that while most of my students had stood, half were barely mumbling the Pledge while the rest weren’t saying out aloud at all. You know that thing in church where you mouth the words to the hymns you don’t know? It was like that, only I’m sure they knew it – this just wasn’t a thing they did. Not with any enthusiasm, anyway. Except for the NEW GUY, apparently.

At that point, of course, there were only two options. Stop – or at least dial it WAY back – on my first day in a new school in front of a new class and baptize my opening day in awkwardness and stifled embarrassment, or… OWN IT. So baby, I OWNED IT.

“AND TO THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS – ONE NATION, UNDER GOD, INDIVISIBLE, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL.”

And then I went on with my lesson as if this were the most normal thing in the world. The next day, I did the exact same thing – loud and confident, as if I were the most patriotic individual in the state. Never once did anyone question my enthusiasm or belittle my volume. Never once did I think I could risk dialing it back a bit, lest I cast retroactive doubt and awkwardness over everything I’d done since.

I’m not suggesting this was in any way rational. But people rarely are.

“Have To” History: Supreme Court Cases

I recently finished “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases, of which I’m quite proud. I’ve started putting together information and drafts for a second volume, which may or may not be titled something like “Have To” History: A Wall of Separation (Public School Edition).

I’m still working out the title. And the format. And the content. But for whatever reason, I do love me some Supreme Court cases – even the written opinions. Below and in my next post, I’m sharing rough drafts of two of the earliest cases likely to be included. They reached the Supreme Court only three years apart, and both involve little children not saying the Pledge of Allegiance because they believed it violated the Word of God to do so. Both cases were pursued as “freedom of religion” issues, but both were resolved on “free speech” grounds more than anything “wall of separation”-ish.

Oh, and the second case completely reversed everything the Court said in the first. So that was wacky, jurisprudentially-speaking.

Here’s Part One…

One Nation, Quite Divisible, With Liberty and Justice for Those Who Cooperate

Arguably no religious group faced more persecution and hostility in the 20th century United States than the Jehovah’s Witnesses. They proselytized aggressively in the streets and went door-to-door offering copies of The Watchtower and wanting to talk about the “end times.” They were not a group known for political engagement. They didn’t usually vote, most rejected Social Security numbers as a “mark of the beast,” and leadership discouraged serving on juries or other forms of civic participation. Believers were expected to work for a living, obey the law, and “render unto Caesar” – as long as it did not explicitly conflict with the Word of God.

Despite all this, the Jehovah’s Witnesses have arguably done more than any other religious group to promote freedom of religion and freedom of speech in the U.S. To date, they’ve been involved in something like two dozen U.S. Supreme Court cases, almost all of them concerned with First Amendment protections. The vast majority occurred in the 1930s and 1940s.

In the waning years of the Great Depression, as Europe stumbled towards war, patriotism in the United States became mandatory in all but name. Many states passed laws requiring all public school students to salute the American Flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance each day, apparently assuming that nothing promotes heartfelt commitment like mandatory obeisance. If you’ve seen pictures from the era, you may notice that the standard salute looked different than it does today. Typically, it involved the right arm extended forward and upwards at a slight degree towards the flag as participants chanted in unison their devotion to the collective.

In Nazi Germany, a very similar salute was required of all good citizens, although in the faterland, nationalism was personified in their new Chancellor, Adolph Hitler, rather than a mere flag. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany refused to salute, citing the Second Commandment – “Thou shalt have no other gods before me” – as well as several other Old Testament passages suggesting that the Lord Their God was not a fan of split allegiances. Joseph F. Rutherford, who succeeded Witnesses founder and leader Charles Taze after his death in 1916, suggested American Jehovah’s Witnesses avoid what they saw as similar oaths back home.

German Jehovah’s Witnesses would soon be sent to their deaths in various Nazi concentration camps, while their American counterparts were merely mocked, harassed, accused, and periodically assaulted. The official eruption of World War II in 1939 only increased these tensions, despite the U.S. managing to avoid direct involvement for the first few years. Meanwhile, some Jehovah’s Witnesses schoolchildren who took their beliefs a bit too seriously for the comfort of the masses became the focal point for what had heretofore been scattered and inconsistent suspicion and hostility.

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

Lillian Gobitas (the name was later misspelled in court records), age 12, and her brother Billy, age 10, refused to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance. They believed the Bible forbid such direct promises of obedience to anything or anyone other than the Lord God, and were expelled from school as a result. Their case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which determined in an 8 – 1 vote that the school had the right to require the Pledge as part of promoting good citizenship. It wasn’t a violation of Constitutional rights because the requirement didn’t target their religion intentionally.

From the Majority Opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter:

The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization… The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution…
The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our independent judgment. Even were we convinced of the folly of such a measure, such belief would be no proof of its unconstitutionality… But the courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy. It is not our province to choose among competing considerations in the subtle process of securing effective loyalty to the traditional ideals of democracy, while respecting at the same time individual idiosyncracies among a people so diversified in racial origins and religious allegiances.

Justice Harlan Stone wrote one of the most famous dissenting opinions in Court history in response. Several of his points would be revisited when a new majority overturned Minersville a mere three years later. Behold the power of a well-penned dissent:

The law which is thus sustained is unique in the history of Anglo-American legislation. It does more than suppress freedom of speech, and more than prohibit the free exercise of religion, which concededly are forbidden by the First Amendment and are violations of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth. For, by this law, the state seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious convictions…
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed, as they are now, at politically helpless minorities…
The Constitution may well elicit expressions of loyalty to it and to the government which it created, but it does not command such expressions or otherwise give any indication that compulsory expressions of loyalty play any such part in our scheme of government as to override the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and religion. And while such expressions of loyalty, when voluntarily given, may promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say that their compulsory expression by children in violation of their own and their parents’ religious convictions can be regarded as playing so important a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.

The Red, White, Black & Blue

While there were vocal critics of the Gobitis decision, especially in the press, many Americans took it as federal validation of whatever they wished to do to Jehovah’s Witnesses in their area. Violence against believers surged dramatically, often times with local law enforcement standing by but refusing to interfere – no doubt out of some degree of personal prejudice, but now with the perceived sanction of the nation’s highest court.

We like to imagine the Supreme Court as remaining safely beyond the pale of popular opinion or social forces, but they are at times quite human and may even read the news from time to time. The makeup of the Court evolves as well, and shortly after the Gobitis decision, it changed rather dramatically. Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes retired, as did Justice McReynolds. Justice Stone, author of the sole dissent in Gobitis, was promoted to Chief Justice, and Justices Robert Jackson and Wiley Rutledge joined the Court.

Jones v. City of Opelika was a case first considered by the Court in 1941 and once again involved Jehovah’s Witnesses. The issue was whether or not the State can charge “licensing fees” on religious books and pamphlets. The Court initially determined that they could. Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Francis Murphy – all of whom had voted with the majority in Gobitis – added a dissent in which they repudiated their previous decision:

The opinion of the Court {in Jones v. Opelika} sanctions a device which, in our opinion, suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction which Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) took against the same religious minority, and is a logical extension of the principles upon which that decision rested. Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it was also wrongly decided.
Certainly our democratic form of government functioning under the historic Bill of Rights has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those views may be. The First Amendment does not put the right freely to exercise religion in a subordinate position. We fear, however, that the opinions in these and in the Gobitis case do exactly that.

Jones was reconsidered the following session, and in 1942 the Court reversed itself on this Neo-Stamp Act. Combined with the comments of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, it was clear that the winds of jurisprudential change were blowing – and briskly.

As it turned out, those little Jehovah’s Witnesses kids still refused to have other gods before the Big One. It was a mere three years before almost the exact same “Heil ‘Merica!” case came before the High Court once again. The second time, the results would be a tiny bit different.

Moment of Silence – Bown v. Gwinnett County School District (1997) / Brown v. Gilmore (2001)

February 12, 2017June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

Two cases in the early 1960s largely eliminated state-sponsored prayer from public schooling. Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington v. Schempp (1963) are to this day touted by the far right as responsible for having kicked God out of schools – leading inevitably to sex, drugs, violence, rock’n’roll, corduroy, divorce, the pill, AIDS, the Clintons, terrorism, and a Kenyan sleeper-cell Mooslim illegitimately seizing the White House for eight long, painful years.

The solution, of course, is to get God back IN our schools by requiring regimented recitation of state-approved chants. He LOVES those! Do this, we are assured, and America’s problems will vanish faster than you can say “civil liberties!”

Alabama led the way in the 1980s with a series of legislation which eventually led to Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), the only “Moment of Silence” case to reach the Supreme Court to date. The Court determined that the state could mandate a “moment of silence” during the school day, but could not lead or even encourage prayer during that time.

The goals of Alabama’s legislation were no secret – state legislators ran on promises to get prayer back into schools, or as close as they could get it. That’s largely what stifled further establishment in Alabama – the Court refused to pretend the history and rhetoric associated with legislation didn’t exist while considering its constitutionality.

Legislative leaders in other states took note and began exercising greater caution as they argued for moments of silence of their own. Suddenly this 60-second period would promote non-violence and academic reflection and gluten-free living and all sorts of things.

A decade after Wallace, Georgia passed its own version of a “moment of silence.” It was challenged by a classroom teacher and ended up in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as Bown v. Gwinnett County School District (1997). The Court determined that the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act did NOT violate the Establishment Clause.

The Court’s written opinion is unremarkable, but includes some details of note, such as this bit from what they call the Act’s “uncodified preamble”:

The General Assembly finds that in today’s hectic society, all too few of our citizens are able to experience even a moment of quiet reflection before plunging headlong into the day’s activities. Our young citizens are particularly affected by this absence of an opportunity for a moment of quiet reflection. The General Assembly finds that our young, and society as a whole, would be well served if students were afforded a moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of each day in the public schools.

It’s an absurd bit of glossy nonsense, but it’s constitutional nonsense. We could all probably benefit from drinking more water as well, but I notice no one’s mandating a moment of refreshing hydration each morning. But whatever.

Also in the ‘History of the Case’:

Senator David Scott, the primary sponsor of the Act… represented an urban district in Atlanta, Georgia. He was the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee… and a member of the State Violence Task Force Committee to prevent violence in schools. Senator Scott introduced {the Moment of Silence bill} as a part of a package of legislation aimed at reducing violence among Georgia’s youths.

I realize I’m a bit cynical, but 60 seconds of mandatory head-bowing seems a poor substitute for addressing poverty, mental health, drug addiction, sexual abuse, etc. But perhaps I assume too much.

Senator Scott had observed that after several killings on school campuses, students came together to have a moment of silent reflection. Noting that this moment of silence seemed to be beneficial and calming, Senator Scott believed that providing students with an opportunity for silent introspection at the beginning of each school day would help to combat violence among Georgia’s students.

I guess we’re lucky Georgia didn’t mandate a daily mock funeral ceremony using the same reasoning.

During debates over the bill, some state legislators liked it specifically because it was a step towards school prayer. Others opposed it for the same reason. Wisely, many in favor of the bill went on record arguing that it didn’t promote school prayer or have any religious purpose at all. That gave the Court enough cover as to the purpose of the bill that they could in good conscience consider it “religiously neutral.”

The teacher who initiated the case, Brian Brown, argued that the law violated the Establishment Clause and cited the “Lemon Test” to prove it. No surprise, then, that the 11th Circuit used Lemon to respond.

The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the challenged statute have a “clearly secular purpose” … However, the statute’s purpose need not be exclusively secular… A statute violates the Establishment Clause if it is “entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion” …
To ascertain a statute’s purpose, it is, of course, necessary to examine the language of the statute on its face… It is also appropriate to consider the legislative history of the statute and the specific sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the statute.

The Court cites both the law itself and its context and presentation by way of establishing that the law explicitly avoids promoting religious activities during this magical minute. At the same time, should a child choose to bow their head or clutch their rosary beads during the moment of life-altering focus and de-violencing, the state may not discourage them from so doing.

The Court specifically addresses the difference in dynamics between this situation and Jaffree – largely distinguished by what was said in debates leading up to passage, and contemporaneous legislation with similar goals.

Issues involving motivation or purpose of pro-religious legislation are sometimes determinative, sometimes merely a factor in the larger discussion, and (especially recently) sometimes completely ignored altogether. Nevertheless, just to be safe, lawmakers are highly encouraged to be completely disingenuous when proposing and debating such legislation in order to assure they pass judicial muster. They needn’t feel bad. It’s like Jesus said, “You must obscure the truth, because the truth will just get in the way.”

In Jaffree, the primary sponsor of the Alabama statute and the Governor of Alabama both explicitly conceded that the purpose of the Alabama statute was to return prayer to the Alabama schools, and Alabama failed to present any evidence of a secular purpose… In contrast, in this case, the primary sponsor of the Act indicated that the Act had a secular purpose.
It is true, as Bown argues, that some legislators expressed the desire to return prayer to Georgia’s schools and supported the Act for this reason. However, it is also true that other legislators felt that the Act did not involve school prayer…

You get the idea.

Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a statute violates the Establishment Clause if its primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion…
The announcement made over the school intercom by Principal Hendrix indicated only that there would be a moment of silence to reflect on the day’s activities. This announcement in no way suggested that students should or should not pray silently during the moment of quiet reflection…
There is no indication in this case that any teacher encouraged prayer in violation of the guidelines stated in the Administrative Bulletin. There is no evidence in this case that any students were exhorted to pray, favored for praying, or disfavored for not praying…

The Court then contrasts this dynamic with situations in which students may feel indirectly, if not explicitly, coerced, such as in Lee v. Weisman (1992) and finds they’re not at all similar. There’s no advancement of religion here.

The third prong of the Lemon test dictates that the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion…
We conclude that there is no excessive entanglement in this case.

Yeah, that was going to be a tough sell at best.

All that the Act requires is that the students and the teacher in charge remain silent during the moment of quiet reflection. Teachers are not required to participate in or lead prayers, nor are they required to review the content of prayers during the moment of quiet reflection…

They’re not only “not required;” they’re specifically prohibited from so doing.

The fact that a teacher must stop a student who prays audibly or otherwise makes noise during the moment of quiet reflection does not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. There are many times during any given school day when teachers tell their students to be quiet and when audible activity of any kind is not permitted. The fact that this particular period of silence is mandated statewide does not create entanglement problems.

A few short years later, Virginia took their turn. The resulting case, Brown v. Gilmore (2001), was heard and decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the outcome was basically the same. It’s notable for being the first instance I’ve come across of the specific phrasing used by many state legislatures since, including Oklahoma’s. Here’s how Oklahoma’s statute reads, in case you’re curious:

The board of education of each school district shall ensure that the public schools within the district observe approximately one minute of silence each day for the purpose of allowing each student, in the exercise of his or her individual choice, to reflect, meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity that does not interfere with, distract, or impede other students in the exercise of their individual choices.

But there’s more…

The Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma is hereby authorized to intervene in any legal proceeding to enforce the provisions of this act and shall represent any school district or employee named as a defendant therein.

Ha! Defensive, much?

Several similar cases have produced comparable results in other federal courts. They each have their own quirks, but the pattern is clear.

With the sudden national lurch to the right (and away from even token concern with civil liberties or the sincerity of inflicted faith), it remains to be seen what may come next. For now, however, the “moment of silence” – a pointless exercise designed only to allow legislators to walk right up to that line separating church and state and kick dirt on its trousers – is on solid constitutional ground.

Presumably this is already rolling back forty years of decadence and cultural decline. If not, we might have to up it to two minutes.

A Wall of Separation – Bown v. Gwinnett County School District (1997)

February 8, 2017June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

The Court’s written opinion is unremarkable, but includes some details of note, such as this bit from what they call the Act’s “uncodified preamble”:

The General Assembly finds that in today’s hectic society, all too few of our citizens are able to experience even a moment of quiet reflection before plunging headlong into the day’s activities. Our young citizens are particularly affected by this absence of an opportunity for a moment of quiet reflection. The General Assembly finds that our young, and society as a whole, would be well served if students were afforded a moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of each day in the public schools.

It’s an absurd bit of glossy nonsense, but it’s constitutional nonsense. We could all probably benefit from drinking more water as well, but I notice no one’s mandating a moment of refreshing hydration each morning. I’m just saying.

Also in the ‘History of the Case’:

Senator David Scott, the primary sponsor of the Act… represented an urban district in Atlanta, Georgia. He was the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee… and a member of the State Violence Task Force Committee to prevent violence in schools. Senator Scott introduced {the Moment of Silence bill} as a part of a package of legislation aimed at reducing violence among Georgia’s youths.

I realize I’m a bit cynical, but 60 seconds of mandatory head-bowing seems a poor substitute for addressing poverty, mental health, drug addiction, sexual abuse, etc. But perhaps I assume too much.

Senator Scott had observed that after several killings on school campuses, students came together to have a moment of silent reflection. Noting that this moment of silence seemed to be beneficial and calming, Senator Scott believed that providing students with an opportunity for silent introspection at the beginning of each school day would help to combat violence among Georgia’s students.

I guess we’re lucky Georgia didn’t mandate a daily mock funeral ceremony using the same reasoning.

During debates over the bill, some state legislators liked it specifically because it was a step towards school prayer. Others opposed it for the same reason. Wisely, many in favor of the bill went on record arguing that it didn’t promote school prayer or have any religious purpose at all. That gave the Court enough cover as to the purpose of the bill that they could in good conscience consider it “religiously neutral.”

The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the challenged statute have a “clearly secular purpose” … However, the statute’s purpose need not be exclusively secular… A statute violates the Establishment Clause if it is “entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion” …
To ascertain a statute’s purpose, it is, of course, necessary to examine the language of the statute on its face… It is also appropriate to consider the legislative history of the statute and the specific sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the statute.

The Court cites both the law itself and its context and presentation by way of establishing that the law explicitly avoids promoting religious activities during this magical minute. At the same time, should a child choose to bow their head or clutch their rosary beads during the moment of life-altering, the state may not discourage them from so doing.

The Court specifically addresses the difference in dynamics between this situation and Wallace. It’s largely a matter of what was said in debates leading up to passage, and surrounding legislation with similar goals.

I cannot emphasize this enough. All subsequent efforts to nudge religious rituals back into government schooling will be made with an awareness that public arguments and discussions may be factored in to any resulting constitutional challenges. Lawmakers are essentially encouraged to be disingenuous if they wish to pass judicial muster.

In Jaffree, the primary sponsor of the Alabama statute and the Governor of Alabama both explicitly conceded that the purpose of the Alabama statute was to return prayer to the Alabama schools, and Alabama failed to present any evidence of a secular purpose… In contrast, in this case, the primary sponsor of the Act indicated that the Act had a secular purpose.
It is true, as Bown argues, that some legislators expressed the desire to return prayer to Georgia’s schools and supported the Act for this reason. However, it is also true that other legislators felt that the Act did not involve school prayer…

You get the idea.

Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a statute violates the Establishment Clause if its primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion…
The announcement made over the school intercom by Principal Hendrix indicated only that there would be a moment of silence to reflect on the day’s activities. This announcement in no way suggested that students should or should not pray silently during the moment of quiet reflection…
There is no indication in this case that any teacher encouraged prayer in violation of the guidelines stated in the Administrative Bulletin. There is no evidence in this case that any students were exhorted to pray, favored for praying, or disfavored for not praying…

The third prong of the Lemon test dictates that the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion…
We conclude that there is no excessive entanglement in this case.

Yeah, that was going to be a tough sell at best.

All that the Act requires is that the students and the teacher in charge remain silent during the moment of quiet reflection. Teachers are not required to participate in or lead prayers, nor are they required to review the content of prayers during the moment of quiet reflection…

They’re not only “not required;” they’re specifically prohibited from so doing.

The fact that a teacher must stop a student who prays audibly or otherwise makes noise during the moment of quiet reflection does not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. There are many times during any given school day when teachers tell their students to be quiet and when audible activity of any kind is not permitted. The fact that this particular period of silence is mandated statewide does not create entanglement problems.

A few short years later, Virginia took their turn. The resulting case, Brown v. Gilmore (2001), was heard and decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the outcome was basically the same. Several others have produced comparable results in other federal courts. They each have their own quirks, but the pattern is clear.

With the recent lurch of all three branches to the right, and away from even token concern with civil liberties or sincere belief, it’s hard to guess what may come next. But for now, the “moment of silence” – a pointless exercise designed only to allow legislators to walk right up to that line separating church and state and kick dirt on its trousers – is on solid constitutional ground.

It remains to be seen whether the practice is sufficient to roll back forty years of decadence and cultural decline. We might have to up it to two minutes.

Wall of Separation (Supreme Court Cases & Such) – Updated

January 14, 2017June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

A few months ago, I started blogging about Supreme Court cases delineating the relationships between religion and public schooling. In order to use some of the case summaries in class, I started editing and reformatting them afterwards. Then I figured since the work was already being done, and this effort at providing classroom resources in PDF format was already underway… why not just post them as I go?

Here’s my in-progress summary of cases involving church/state issues in relation to public schooling – and a few which aren’t.

Building A “Wall of Separation” (Faith & School) – Brief background to the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights and Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists which introduced the phrase “a wall of separation between Church & State.”

Everson v. Board of Education (1947) – It’s OK for the state to reimburse parents for transportation costs of getting their children to school, whether public or private, sectarian or secular.

McCollum v. Board of Education of School District (1948) – The use of public school facilities by religious organizations to give religious instruction to school children violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This does not prohibit teaching about religion, or schools allowing religious groups to use their facilities outside of school ours (as long as they do so equitably). It does prohibit coercing students into religious instruction as part of the school day.

Engel v. Vitale (1962) – The state can NOT require – or even promote – prayer in public schools as part of the school day.

Abington v. Schempp (1963) – The state can NOT require or promote the reading of Bible verses or recitation of the Lord’s Prayer as stand-alone activities during the school day. (Studying the Bible or the Christian religion as part of history, literature, etc., still perfectly appropriate.)

Board of Education v. Allen (1968) – It’s OK for the state to provide textbooks free of charge to all secondary students (Grades 7 – 12), including those in private schools. An important part of the Court’s reasoning in this case was that the textbooks constituted aid directly to students, rather than institutions.

Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) – Not specifically a ‘religion in schools’ case. It’s OK for states to offer property tax exemptions for groups serving the public good – even if they’re religious in nature.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) – State aid to sectarian institutions such as private Catholic schools violates the Establishment Clause and is unconstitutional. This case also established “The Lemon Test” – “Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion… finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’…”

Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) – The state’s interest in an educated citizenry is outweighed by the right of the Amish to maintain their faith and their communities. Parents may pull their children out of public schooling for religious reasons once they turn 16 – especially given the Amish track record for becoming productive, well-behaved members of society. The Court had previously attempted to distinguish between regulating beliefs and regulating behavior – in this case, the two were the inseparable. They instead introduced the idea of “balanced interests’ – the state’s interest in an educated populace vs. the parents’ or individual’ interest in pursuing their faith as they see fit.

Meek v. Pittenger (1975) – It’s unconstitutional for the state to provide materials and equipment for non-public schools, or to pay for support services for students at those schools. As in Allen, however, textbooks (for traditional subjects) were fine.

Stone v. Graham (1980) – State cannot require schools to post the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, even if paid for by private money.

Mueller v. Allen (1983) – It’s OK for the state to let parents deduct expenses related to “tuition, textbooks, and transportation” for their children, regardless of whether their child attends public or private school, even if sectarian. Significantly, the Court determined that as long as the intent is secular, it’s OK for the effect to significantly favor parents sending their kids to religious schools. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) – While a “moment of silence” is fine, any nudging towards prayer, especially with teacher participation, is unconstitutional. This issue will come up again.

Aguilar v. Felton (1985)– A NYC program sending public school teachers into parochial schools to provide extra help for disadvantaged children was ruled an unconstitutional “entanglement” of church and state, thus violating the Establishment Clause. This ruling was overturned a decade later in Agostini v. Felton (1997).

Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986) – A state agency which provided assistance to blind students pursuing education or job training may continue to do so even if the education/profession being pursued is religious in nature. This case didn’t involve public education, but did nudge along an understanding of the law which certainly does. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) – Students produced two articles for the school newspaper which dealt with teenage pregnancy and in which students at the schools shared their firsthand experiences, including various conflicts involving their families. The school principal determined the subject matter to be inappropriate and efforts to protect the girls’ identities insufficient, and the stories were pulled. Students protested that their First Amendment rights were being violated. The Supreme Court eventually ruled 5-3 that the principal had the right to make this decision because the newspaper was a product of the school and created as part of a journalism class, for which students were receiving credit and a grade.

Lee v. Weisman (1992) – It’s unconstitutional for schools to have clergymen offering prayers at graduation ceremonies, no matter how general or brief the prayers. Even if not technically ‘required’, or even on school property, participation is still coerced and thus a violation of the “establishment clause.”

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) – Students attending private sectarian schools are still entitled to support services from public schools – in this case, a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Agostini v. Felton (1997) – Overturned Aguilar v. Felton (1985). It was no longer considered a violation of the Establishment Clause for a state-sponsored education initiative to send public school teachers into religious schools, so long as reasonable steps were taken to minimize “entanglement.”

Santa Fe ISD v. Doe (2000), Part One: Overview – Background to landmark Supreme Court Case in which the Court decided that organized prayer during school events using school resources was unconstitional – even if students “voted” on it.

Santa Fe ISD v. Doe (2000) – Part Two: If She Weighs The Same As A Duck… – The impact of mingling church and state on dissenters. Spoiler: it gets ugly rather quickly.

Santa Fe ISD v. Doe (2000) – Part Three: A Little Leaven Leaveneth The Whole Lump – The impact of mixing church and state on the faith being “defended.” Spoiler: it gets ugly rather quickly.

Let’s Talk About Vouchers, Part One (What Happened In Cleveland?) – Background to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), a seminal Supreme Court Case in which the Court decided that efforts to improve education in Ohio – including the use of vouchers – did not violate the Establishment Clause.

Let’s Talk About Vouchers, Part Two (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002) – My brilliant breakdown of the decision itself.

Let’s Talk About Vouchers, Part Three (The Majority Opinion in Zelman) – Insights from the Majority Opinion.

Let’s Talk About Vouchers, Part Four (The Story So Far) – A summary of more recent court decisions at various levels dealing with vouchers and other “school choice” variations as of December 2016.

The Ten Commandments (Part One) – Background, the “Lemon Test,” some cases which made the news but not the Supreme Court Docket, and two that did – McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005).

The Ten Commandments (Part Two) – Recap of Part One, Pleasant Grove v. Summum (2009), Green v Haskell County Board of Commissioners (2009), and Felix v. Bloomfield (2014).

There will be more. I’m looking at “moment of silence” stuff, and will eventually follow up on other “school choice” cases. I’ll probably grab some quirky school-related cases not necessarily tied to “wall of separation” issues as well, in which case I’ll probably have to rename the next update. In any case, if you’re into that sort of thing, check back soon.