A Wall of Separation – The Story So Far…

November 13, 2016June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

Now that the elections are over and all that is good or true in the world has been destroyed, I’m trying to shift my focus back to educational stuff. You know, the things that at one time seemed important enough to shape the title of this blog?

A few months ago, I started by blogging about Supreme Court cases delineating the relationships between religion and public schooling. In order to use some of the case summaries in class, I started editing and reformatting them afterwards. Then I figured since the work was already being done, and this effort at providing classroom resources in PDF format was already underway… why not just post them as I go?

Here’s my in-progress summary of cases involving church/state issues in relation to public schooling – and a few which aren’t.

Building A “Wall of Separation” (Faith & School) – Brief background to the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights and Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists which introduced the phrase “a wall of separation between Church & State.”

Everson v. Board of Education (1947) – It’s OK for the state to reimburse parents for transportation costs of getting their children to school, whether public or private, sectarian or secular.

McCollum v. Board of Education of School District (1948) – The use of public school facilities by religious organizations to give religious instruction to school children violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This does not prohibit teaching about religion, or schools allowing religious groups to use their facilities outside of school ours (as long as they do so equitably). It does prohibit coercing students into religious instruction as part of the school day.

Engel v. Vitale (1962) – The state can NOT require – or even promote – prayer in public schools as part of the school day.

Abington v. Schempp (1963) – The state can NOT require or promote the reading of Bible verses or recitation of the Lord’s Prayer as stand-alone activities during the school day. (Studying the Bible or the Christian religion as part of history, literature, etc., still perfectly appropriate.)

Board of Education v. Allen (1968) – It’s OK for the state to provide textbooks free of charge to all secondary students (Grades 7 – 12), including those in private schools. An important part of the Court’s reasoning in this case was that the textbooks constituted aid directly to students, rather than institutions.

Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) – Not specifically a ‘religion in schools’ case. It’s OK for states to offer property tax exemptions for groups serving the public good – even if they’re religious in nature.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) – State aid to sectarian institutions such as private Catholic schools violates the Establishment Clause and is unconstitutional. This case also established “The Lemon Test” – “Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion… finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’…”

Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) – The state’s interest in an educated citizenry is outweighed by the right of the Amish to maintain their faith and their communities. Parents may pull their children out of public schooling for religious reasons once they turn 16 – especially given the Amish track record for becoming productive, well-behaved members of society. The Court had previously attempted to distinguish between regulating beliefs and regulating behavior – in this case, the two were the inseparable. They instead introduced the idea of “balanced interests’ – the state’s interest in an educated populace vs. the parents’ or individual’ interest in pursuing their faith as they see fit.

Meek v. Pittenger (1975) – It’s unconstitutional for the state to provide materials and equipment for non-public schools, or to pay for support services for students at those schools. As in Allen, however, textbooks (for traditional subjects) were fine.

Stone v. Graham (1980) – State cannot require schools to post the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, even if paid for by private money.

Mueller v. Allen (1983) – It’s OK for the state to let parents deduct expenses related to “tuition, textbooks, and transportation” for their children, regardless of whether their child attends public or private school, even if sectarian. Significantly, the Court determined that as long as the intent is secular, it’s OK for the effect to significantly favor parents sending their kids to religious schools. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) – While a “moment of silence” is fine, any nudging towards prayer, especially with teacher participation, is unconstitutional. This issue will come up again.

Aguilar v. Felton (1985)– A NYC program sending public school teachers into parochial schools to provide extra help for disadvantaged children was ruled an unconstitutional “entanglement” of church and state, thus violating the Establishment Clause. This ruling was overturned a decade later in Agostini v. Felton (1997).

Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986) – A state agency which provided assistance to blind students pursuing education or job training may continue to do so even if the education/profession being pursued is religious in nature. This case didn’t involve public education, but did nudge along an understanding of the law which certainly does. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) – Students produced two articles for the school newspaper which dealt with teenage pregnancy and in which students at the schools shared their firsthand experiences, including various conflicts involving their families. The school principal determined the subject matter to be inappropriate and efforts to protect the girls’ identities insufficient, and the stories were pulled. Students protested that their First Amendment rights were being violated. The Supreme Court eventually ruled 5-3 that the principal had the right to make this decision because the newspaper was a product of the school and created as part of a journalism class, for which students were receiving credit and a grade.

Lee v. Weisman (1992) – It’s unconstitutional for schools to have clergymen offering prayers at graduation ceremonies, no matter how general or brief the prayers. Even if not technically ‘required’, or even on school property, participation is still coerced and thus a violation of the “establishment clause.”

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) – Students attending private sectarian schools are still entitled to support services from public schools – in this case, a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student. This case is considered one of the three foundational cases leading up to vouchers.

Agostini v. Felton (1997) – Overturned Aguilar v. Felton (1985). It was no longer considered a violation of the Establishment Clause for a state-sponsored education initiative to send public school teachers into religious schools, so long as reasonable steps were taken to minimize “entanglement.”

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) – Seminal Supreme Court Case in which education improvement efforts undertaken by the State of Ohio, and which included school vouchers as part of the while, were determined to be constitutional in terms of the Establishment Clause. I’ve written several posts about this one, starting with the background, the decision, and the majority opinion. I’ve also summarized more recent court decisions at various levels dealing with vouchers and other “school choice” variations.

The Ten Commandments (Part One) – Background, the “Lemon Test,” some cases which made the news but not the Supreme Court Docket, and two that did – McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005).

The Ten Commandments (Part Two) – Recap of Part One, Pleasant Grove v. Summum (2009), Green v Haskell County Board of Commissioners (2009), and Felix v. Bloomfield (2014).

There will be more. I’m looking at “moment of silence” cases, some other “prayer in schools” situations, and of course that “vouchers” case I’ve been building up to for awhile. If you’re into that sort of thing, check back soon.

A Wall of Separation – Agostini v. Felton (1997)

October 6, 2016June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

In 1985, the Supreme Court heard a case from NYC in which public school teachers were being sent into parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged students. It was decided in Aguilar v. Felton (1985) that this created an excessive entanglement of church and state, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states via the Fourteenth.

Twelve years later, the Court changed its mind.

Prior to Aguilar in 1985, NYC was already going to great lengths in their effort to reconcile seemingly incongruent obligations. State law required them to provide remediation for Title I students, wherever they went to school, while established case law barred them from “entanglement” with sectarian efforts.

First they tried having the students come to the public schools at the end of the regular school day. That didn’t work – too difficult to maintain consistency. These weren’t students for whom transportation and out-of-school support systems were generally reliable.

Next they tried sending the teachers to the private schools at the end of the day. Constitutional safeguards were put into place in an attempt to avoid “excessive entanglement.” Teachers were given special training and written instructions on how to stay secular. Equipment or supplies from each school or devoted to different functions were not allowed to mix – no using Catholic chalk to show that remedial math problem, or leaving your secular legal pads behind and risk Baptist note-taking on them the next day.

No team teaching. No mixed activities. One wonders if perhaps eye contact with anyone wearing an angel pin was discouraged. Remedial instruction could only take place in rooms bereft of religious symbols or imagery, despite the fact that students had been surrounded by sectarian materials the entire day leading up to these lessons.

Teachers were randomly assigned to different sites. In some cases, care was taken to send teachers of one faith to schools of another. Can you imagine that team meeting? “Now, Dakota – you’re getting more and more Baptist every day from what I can tell from your Facebook posts. Let’s send you to Mother of Grace Cathedral. And Gary – you’re still pretty much unbearably Unitarian, yes? Alright – off to Word of Faith of Power Academy with you then!”

I’m, um… speculating, of course. Gary might have been agnostic.

Finally, supervisors were required to make multiple, unannounced visits to ensure no Establishing or Free-Exercise-Limiting was accidentally occurring. “Are you SURE they sneezed right before you snuck in that ‘Bless You’?!?”

Even with all of that, the Court decided in 1985 that these efforts were insufficient. So the Board of Education of NYC tried adding to their “wall of separation.”

They spent millions leasing neutral property and buying separate equipment to be used in remedial instruction, including vans which were essentially converted into ‘mobile classrooms’ to be parked near the sectarian schools, but not on “sectarian property.”

In short, complying with both the dictates of the Court and the demands of effective remediation turned into an expensive sort of ridiculous.

Agostini v. Felton (1997) began when the district filed several motions in Federal District Court seeking exemptions from the rules established by Aguilar. Their argument was threefold:

1. The costs involved were undermining the entire purpose of their efforts – and were well-beyond what could have been anticipated when Aguilar was decided. Legally, this constituted a “change of fact” – one reason the Court sometimes reverses itself. In other words, the situation was different, so perhaps the decision should be, too.

2. In the decade since Aguilar, multiple written opinions – both majority and dissenting – in other cases heard by the Court had expressed a desire to reconsider this decision.

3. Decisions in related cases over that same time period were already moving towards overturning Aguilar. If the precedent was already crumbling, it was time to re-evaluate.

The Court was not particularly swayed by either of the first two arguments, but that last one won the day. Agostini v. Felton (1997) overturned Aguilar v. Felton (1985) in a 5-4 split decision. It was no longer considered a violation of the Establishment Clause for a state-sponsored education initiative to send public school teachers into religious schools, so long as reasonable steps were taken to minimize “entanglement.”

The majority opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, revisits the reasoning used to decide Aguilar twelve years before, including – once again – our famous “Lemon Test.” She also discusses numerous other cases whose outcomes shape the Court’s reasoning in current circumstances.

For those of you new to jurisprudence, that’s how the Court works – they interpret laws, of course, and they’re tasked with determining the constitutionality of what’s before them based on both original intent and evolving circumstances. One of the primary tools used to do this is the Court’s own history.

Stare Decisis is the principle that the Court will generally abide by its own previous decisions unless there’s very good reason to do otherwise. It’s a critical element of the system if lower courts, institutions, and impacted citizens are to have any idea what’s considered acceptable in the eyes of the law.

If we are to be a nation of laws, rather than men (a high ideal, to be sure), then some degree of predictability in that law is essential.

O’Connor explains the Court’s change of thinking step by step:

As we have repeatedly recognized, government inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Our cases subsequent to Aguilar have, however, modified in two significant respects the approach we use to assess indoctrination.
First, we have abandoned the presumption… that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion…

The Court cites Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) by way of example, including this bit:

Zobrest therefore expressly rejected the notion… that, solely because of her presence on private school property, a public employee will be presumed to inculcate religion in the students. Zobrest also implicitly repudiated another assumption… that the presence of a public employee on private school property creates an impermissible “symbolic link” between government and religion…

The next basis for the Aguilar decision was essentially overturned by Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986)

Second, we have departed from the rule… that all government aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid… Even though the grant recipient clearly would use the money to obtain religious education, we observed that the tuition grants were “made available generally without regard to the sectarian nonsectarian, or public nonpublic nature of the institution benefited”…

Notice that the argument is as much about professionalism and practicality as it is the finer points of constitutional law:

Indeed, each of the premises upon which we relied {previously} to reach a contrary conclusion is no longer valid. First, there is no reason to presume that, simply because she enters a parochial school classroom, a full time public employee such as a Title I teacher will depart from her assigned duties and instructions and embark on religious indoctrination, any more than there was a reason in Zobrest to think an interpreter would inculcate religion by altering her translation of classroom lectures.
Certainly, no evidence has ever shown that any New York City Title I instructor teaching on parochial school premises attempted to inculcate religion in students. Thus, both our precedent and our experience require us to reject respondents’ remarkable argument that we must presume Title I instructors to be “uncontrollable and sometimes very unprofessional.”

As to the question of impact – does the effect of the legislation inhibit or promote religion – the Court adapts a line of thinking similar to that in Mueller v. Allen (1983). The opportunity is neutral towards religion, even if the results benefit one group more than another.

A number of our Establishment Clause cases have found that the criteria used for identifying beneficiaries are relevant in a second respect, apart from enabling a court to evaluate whether the program subsidizes religion. Specifically, the criteria might themselves have the effect of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination…
This incentive is not present, however, where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Under such circumstances, the aid is less likely to have the effect of advancing religion…

The Court then turns to the question of “entanglement”:

Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be “excessive” before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause…
Since we have abandoned the assumption that properly instructed public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully, we must also discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring of Title I teachers is required. There is no suggestion in the record before us that unannounced monthly visits of public supervisors are insufficient to prevent or to detect inculcation of religion by public employees…

Just in case there’s any misunderstanding, O’Connor brings it home with great clarity:

To summarize, New York City’s Title I program does not run afoul of any of three primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement…

Justice Souter wrote a fascinating dissent, which several of the other justices joined. His argument is less pragmatic and more big picture. I particularly like this part:

As I will indicate as I go along, I believe Aguilar was a correct and sensible decision…
As is explained elsewhere, the flat ban on subsidization {he means the public support for sectarian institutions} antedates the Bill of Rights and has been an unwavering rule in Establishment Clause cases… The rule expresses the hard lesson learned over and over again in the American past and in the experiences of the countries from which we have come, that religions supported by governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is burdened when the government supports religion.

This echoes sentiments expressed in Engel v. Vitale (1962), and later in Lee v. Weisman (1992).

When the government favors a particular religion or sect, the disadvantage to all others is obvious, but even the favored religion may fear being taint{ed} . . . with corrosive secularism. The favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.

(That last bit included quotes from quotes within other quotes, which made punctuation and citation a bit of a mess – so I just cut everything but the substance. Look it up if you care.)

Souter goes on to quote extensively from various other cases and authorities on the danger of any hint of “establishment” not to dissenters or the state, but to the faith being thus “established.” It’s a question we too easily ignore today when discussing such things.

He delineates several critical differences between the cases cited in the majority opinion and the specifics before the Court here, but concluded rather poetically – at least in my opinion:

That is not to deny that the facts just recited are regrettable; the object of Title I is worthy without doubt, and the cost of compliance is high. In the short run there is much that is genuinely unfortunate about the administration of the scheme under Aguilar’s rule.
But constitutional lines have to be drawn, and on one side of every one of them is an otherwise sympathetic case that provokes impatience with the Constitution and with the line. But constitutional lines are the price of constitutional government.

I’m not sure there’s anything I can say to top that.

A Wall of Separation – Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

September 23, 2016June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal ~ 1 Comment

So far we’ve done a brief overview of the concept of a ‘Wall of Separation’ between church and state, and covered a few early Supreme Court Cases involving religion and public schools.

We looked at Everson v. Board of Education (1947) in which the Court determined it was perfectly acceptable for the state to reimburse parents for transportation costs of getting their children to school, whether public or private, sectarian or secular.

Then came Engel v. Vitale (1962), in which the Court made clear that the state could NOT require – or even promote – prayer in public schools as part of the school day. It was followed closely by Abington v. Schempp (1963) in which the same decision applied to the reading of Bible verses or the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.

In both of these cases, the Court sought to prevent either the power of government or the foibles of politicians from unduly interfering in man’s reach for the Almighty. This was how they interpreted the Framers’ concerns as expressed in the First Amendment, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth.

In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court established a “checklist” by which interested parties could determine whether or not something violated the “Establishment Clause” or the “Free Exercise Clause” of the First Amendment. While neither exclusive nor absolute, the “Lemon Test” is still regularly referenced today.

In Stone v. Graham (1980), the Court said boo to the required posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. The trend was clear – go easy on pushing your faith via mandatory common education.

But then Reagan took office, and a conservative revolution of sorts swept the nation. I don’t want to overstate the case – it’s not a Disney movie – but for those of you who weren’t there or don’t remember, the Reagan Era wasn’t just a presidential administration. It was a social movement, a political shift, a new dynamic comparable to Kennedy’s “Camelot” in impact – although very different in flavor.

Evangelicals were emboldened and the media and courts demonized as liberals – disgusting and dishonorable, both deceived and deceptive. They were dangers to the nation and everyone in it. Reagan wasn’t evil, at least by modern standards, but he did epitomize a sort of American Exceptionalism in Book-of-Revelation Sauce. The passion and self-righteousness of Ronnie and his adherents pre-empted reason, law, or precedent.

It was in this climate that Alabama decided that Jesus and His legacy simply could not survive much longer without their assistance.

They’d already passed a 1978 law providing for a “moment of silence” each school day “for meditation.” They weren’t the only ones to test this route. Many states or districts instituted some variation of the “moment of silence” after Vitale (1962) and Schempp (1963) made it clear that institutional prayer or other overt Biblization was a no-no.

The “moment of silence” was as much a symbolic move as anything – it served and serves no real purpose or function beyond stepping right up to the line of church-state separation and daring the courts to do something about it. The legislators sponsoring the bill had said as much from the floor; it wasn’t a secret – they were running on their efforts to get prayer back into public schools. Extra credit if you can tell me why that alone should have been enough to invalidate the idea. {Hint: it rhymes with “Women Vest.”}

Alabama took things a step further in 1981, legislating that the moment of silence was to be used “for mediation and voluntary prayer.” Their momentum building, they upped their game yet again in 1982 and instructed teachers to lead “willing students” in a state-written prayer.

Ishmael Jaffree had three kids in Mobile County Public Schools – two in second grade and one in kindergarten. He protested the state-designed prayer, and had plenty of established case law on his side. But that’s not what struck me about his complaint.

Jaffree’s concerns stemmed not from abstract constitutional issues, but from his kindergartener being targeted by other kids for not participating in the prayers. His five-year-old was essentially bullied for not falling into line with state-mandated religious activities.

He wasn’t alone. In a similar case going on in West Virginia at the same time, a Jewish student was challenged by peers for quietly reading during the “moment of silence.” He needed to pray, they told him, or he’d “go to hell with the rest of the Jews.”

Yes, the prayer was technically voluntary – but as anyone in education knows, “voluntary” can mean many different things. In this case, it was legal cover for bad law, an effort to create enough of a loophole to allow Alabama to belittle children for holding to their family’s religious beliefs in ways that didn’t harm or bother anyone, but without the state running afoul of those damned godless liberal judges.

And yes, there comes a time in life – even public school life – where students must be expected to grow up and accept that not everything works the way they want it to and not everyone is nice. We can’t and shouldn’t stop kids from ever saying an unkind word to one another.

That doesn’t mean, however, that the abuse has to be state-sanctioned. That doesn’t mean the state should throw the first pebble then disclaim responsibility when the very children it’s seeking to influence continue the work by throwing stones of their own.

In an interesting wrinkle, the federal district judge who heard this case as it worked its way through the system chose to ignore precedent and declared the laws perfectly constitutional, stating in his decision that “Alabama has the power to establish a State religion if it chooses to do so.” I’m all for waving your little flag at the tank as it rolls through the square, but this wasn’t the powerless standing up to the powerful – this was power trying to take more power.

And it wouldn’t have happened a decade before.

The South was ready to rise again through God, Guns, and the Gipper. Where’s that Confederate Flag and my 12-pack of Keystone?

I promise I’m not blaming every error of the modern world on Ronald Reagan – I was actually quite a fan. But he was wrong when early in his Presidency he proposed a constitutional amendment permitting organized prayer in public schools. He was wrong in his 1984 State of the Union when he asked why “freedom to acknowledge God” couldn’t “be enjoyed again by children in every schoolroom across this land?”

It’s always problematic when we use “freedom” to mean “giving me the power to force you to comply with my beliefs.” Students have always been free to acknowledge God in whatever schoolroom they happen to be. They’ve never been prohibited from praying at appropriate times or discussing their faith with other students, as long as we can have school along the way.

Imagine if President Clinton had insisted that school intercoms, choirs, and bands be used to broadcast, sing, and play Led Zeppelin exclusively, and at least once a day. Is that “bringing back freedom”?

It’s no dis on Zeppelin to suggest that some people much prefer Supertramp, or the Police, or even Etta James. Besides, you have to suspect that it wouldn’t be long before not just ANY Zeppelin would work. If your local Congressman is partial to the B-side of In Through The Out Door, then THAT becomes the only acceptable Zeppelin from here on out. You don’t even get “In The Evening” that way!

Of course you can disagree, but… why do you hate freedom? Are you a threat to our way of life? What are you, Disco?

On a personal note, I must confess that student liberties aside, I’m rather horrified by the use of the Christian faith as this sort of political tire iron. If the God they claim to serve is truly so helpless as to be somehow barred from hallways and classrooms of public schools around the nation, their efforts to facilitate his comeback are both tragic and unwise.

Surely the same Jesus who conquered Death and Hell isn’t lying around half-formed in a forest somewhere, waiting for Wormtail to bring him a few more ingredients for the Holy Cauldron or for Ms. Kravitz to read the right magic prayer out loud enough times.

It’s hard to imagine Paul the Apostle sitting along the road somewhere in Cyrprus, whining that he can’t preach the Gospel until some local legislature makes a rule requiring the Beatitudes be posted in the marketplace or mandating the 23rd Psalm be recited before any and all public lectures.

If your faith only works when government mandates that minors pay it hollow homage, you need a better faith.

But I should probably get back to the case…

While the Bible part and the praying part are consistently prohibited as violations of the Establishment Clause, the “Moment of Silence” has for the most part survived constitutional scrutiny, even while being acknowledged as an “accommodation” of faith – but not an “establishment” or “inhibitor” of faith.

That’s why in Oklahoma, every school day, students are given 5 – 7 seconds to “reflect, meditate, or pray” in any manner not disrupting or distracting those around them. I don’t know about you, but I feel MUCH closer to God as a result. If we were given, say… 12 seconds to work with, who knows what could happen?

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A Wall of Separation – Stone v. Graham (1980)

September 20, 2016June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

On November 17, 1980, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Stone v. Graham – a case involving the required posting of the Ten Commandments on the wall of every classroom in Kentucky.

This was about a month after the release of “Another One Bites the Dust” (Queen), although “Lady” (Kenny Rogers) was at that moment sitting comfortably at the top of the charts. It was less than a month before John Lennon would be murdered and “Just Like Starting Over” would be released and soar to #1.

Reagan had just been elected, although he wouldn’t take office until January, 1981. The nation was approaching Day 400 of the Iranian Hostage Crisis. The “Miracle on Ice” had occurred earlier that year, back when only “amateurs” were allowed to compete in the Olympics. The Rubik’s Cube had just become a thing, Richard Pryor had recently lit himself on fire, and the nation seemed genuinely concerned with figuring out “Who Shot J.R.?”

None of which has anything to do with the case. Just trying to provide a little context, since for some of us 1980 seems like last month, while for others it might as well have been the year they began construction on the Great Wall of China.

So, this case…

The State of Kentucky required that a copy of the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall of every public school classroom. The Commandments were purchased via private contributions, so no state money was used, and teachers were not required to discuss, promote, or even draw attention to the Commandments so posted.

At the bottom of each copy was this explanation: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.”

If you’ve been reading this series on the “Wall of Separation,” you know how this one is going to go – right?

The Court referenced the “Lemon Test” which emerged from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) less than a decade before. This “test” has three parts, but the Court never got to the second base on this one, let alone third.

First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose…

That did it. Shut it down.

They didn’t buy at all the assertion that the Ten Commandments were being used in a primarily secular way or to secular purpose. Had the curriculum included additional examples of historical laws, or a study of the Old Testament as literature, history, or even as a world religion, it would have been fine. As it stood, however, the Commandments were without educational context. Instead, they demanded fealty to a certain God in a certain way following specific interpretations of what that God said and wanted.

Also known as “an establishment of religion.”

It didn’t matter who’d paid for them – the state was requiring and posting them. That’s not how “separation of church at state” works.

Stone vs. Graham (1980) is interesting for several reasons. Well, to me, at least…

It was decided per curium, meaning the majority opinion was issued as written by the Court as a whole rather than a specific Justice. A per curium decision is traditionally used in far more banal situations – explaining why the Court will or won’t hear a case, or when the result is considered obvious or non-controversial.

Given that this was a 5-4 split decision, that clearly wasn’t the case. So the anonymous majority opinion is weird. It’s also not entirely anonymous, since Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent and three other Justices agreed with it. Let’s see, nine Justices, minus those four…

The Supremes also decided this one without hearing arguments from either side. I didn’t know this was a thing, but presumably they figured the lower courts had covered everything they needed to know in order to decide.

Finally, Stone was one of the first cases to rule against such a “passive display” of religion as nevertheless violating the Establishment Clause. It was from this reasoning the Court went on to take issue with some government-sponsored Christmas displays and other state-sanctioned religious ceremonies.

Let’s see if there’s anything fun in this per curium opinion, shall we?

Hmm… they referenced Abington v. Schempp (1963). We’ve covered that one, yes?

They then went straight to the “Lemon Test” – another familiar item to the #11FF.

They eventually referenced Engel v. Vitale (1962) as well. I swear, it’s like they read my blog even back then!

The Court notes that while some of the Commandments are “arguably secular matters, such as honoring one’s parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing…” others are very specific to “the religious duties of believers: worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord’s name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day.”

As in Abington, the Court wants to make sure their decision is not perceived as forbidding all discussion of religious topics:

This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like…
Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no such educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.

There’s a great moment in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent worth sharing here:

The Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from all things which may have a religious significance or origin. This Court has recognized that “religion has been closely identified with our history and government”… and that “{t}he history of man is inseparable from the history of religion”…
Kentucky has decided to make students aware of this fact by demonstrating the secular impact of the Ten Commandments. The words of Justice Jackson, concurring in McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), merit quotation at length:

And yes, I’m about to move from quoting an opinion to quoting an opinion quoted within an opinion. Is it getting Inception up in here?

I think it remains to be demonstrated whether it is possible, even if desirable, to comply with such demands as plaintiff’s completely to isolate and cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably regard as religious instruction.
Perhaps subjects such as mathematics, physics or chemistry are, or can be, completely secularized. But it would not seem practical to teach either practice or appreciation of the arts if we are to forbid exposure of youth to any religious influences. Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of view…
I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of mankind. The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity – both Catholic and Protestant – and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world’s peoples.
One can hardly respect the system of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a part in which he is being prepared.

That last part is significant – “the currents or religious thought that move the world society for a part in which he is being prepared.”

In other words, no student is truly prepared to go out into the world without a basic familiarity with the VARIOUS faiths and cultural norms of the world – not merely their own.

At some point we’ll have to look at how this decision impacted the ability of a state to post the Ten Commandments in other places – say, at that State Capitol or some such thing. Just, you know… hypothetically.

But not this time.

RELATED POST: The Blaine Game

A Wall of Separation – Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) & “The Lemon Test”

September 14, 2016June 4, 2023 ~ Blue Cereal

*Dramatic Voice* Previously, on Blue Cereal Education…

I recently proffered a brief overview of the whole ‘Wall of Separation’ idea in American jurisprudence, then dove into a few early Supreme Court Cases involving religion and public schools.

In neither case was the goal to drive faith out of public education. The Court’s concerns, rather, were to prevent either the power of government or the foibles of politicians from unduly interfering in man’s reach for the Almighty. Or, at least, that’s how they interpreted the Framers’ concerns as expressed in the First Amendment, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth.

The Abington decision included a little checklist by which interested parties could determine whether or not something violated the “establishment” clause or the “free exercise” clause of the First Amendment. That checklist was improved less than a decade later when the Court heard Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).

Which is where we are now.

As of 1969, both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island had lots of private schools, the vast majority of which were Roman Catholic. Then, as now, most private schools operated on tight budgets. The average per-pupil expenditure was lower than in public schools in the same area – even when numbers were adjusted to reflect only “secular education.”

In other words, students in private Catholic schools weren’t benefitting from the same resources as kids in public schools, even when learning science, math, or other non-religious subjects.

Both states passed legislation furnishing supplemental support for these private schools, provided the extra funds were used only for the teaching of secular subjects and buying non-religious materials. In some cases this included helping with teacher salaries.

In both states, some parents complained that this diverted resources from public schools to support sectarian institutions, thus violating the First Amendment.

Only a few years before, the Court had determined in Board of Education v. Allen (1968) that it was acceptable for New York to provide textbooks free of charge to all secondary students (Grades 7 – 12), including those in private schools. Surely, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania reasoned, this was essentially the same sort of non-sectarian support.

It was an interesting question. Is modest financial assistance for a sectarian school more like pushing a little prayer and some Bible verses in Engel or Abington, or supplying bus fare and textbooks as in Everson or Allen? Does state assistance constitute “establishment,” or would eliminating that help violate “free exercise”?

Spoiler Alert: the Court decided almost unanimously that it was the former. The help to Catholic schools was a big Constitutional “no-no.”

The conclusion was far from foregone, however. Lemon came hot-on-the-heels of Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) in which the result had been quite different. Walz wasn’t a public school case, but many of the issues were similar.

The city of New York granted property tax exemptions to religious organizations if the property in question was used exclusively for religious worship – putting them in the same category as schools or charities. Some property owners who did pay taxes argued this violated the Establishment Clause.

The Court determined that while government certainly had no business promoting religion, these tax exemptions didn’t actually do that – not quite. They merely allowed the “free exercise” of groups serving the public good, without the same taxes levied on for-profits. They weren’t “establishing,” the Court said – they were stepping back and letting faithy people do faithy stuff.

The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, cites a number of prior cases by way of illumination – many of them the public school cases we’ve already discussed. At the risk of straying too far from Lemon, he includes a wonderful homage to fallibility and balance worth sharing:

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated, but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute…

I really like that part.

The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other…

In other words, the Court recognized that the best application of First Amendment values wasn’t necessarily obvious in each and every case. Sometimes, protecting the rights of everyone concerned is an imperfect balancing act.

The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and all respects, there shall be a separation of Church and State. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group, and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma…
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited…

So… we’re faithful to the principles by being flexible with specifics. How pragmatic!

Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference…

There’s “room for play in the joints”? *snort*

It almost seems like Burger wanted to dress up what was in reality a collective, black-robed shrug – a mumble to the effect of “we’re just figuring it out was we go.” Of course, in his defense, the “figuring it out” included 15 pages of detailed analysis, history, and jurisprudence.

We also see a foreshadowing of the following year’s “Lemon Test”:

Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end result — the effect — is not an excessive government entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion…

Speaking of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), we should probably get back to that one – seeing as how it’s in the title of the post and all.

As previously mentioned, both laws – in Rhode Island and in Pennsylvania – were found to be unconstitutional entanglements of the state with religion. As with Walz, Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion.

He again acknowledges the difficulty of neither promoting nor hindering religion, although with much less aplomb than he’d managed the year before.

The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is, at best, opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment…
A law may be one “respecting” the forbidden objective while falling short of its total realization. A law “respecting” the proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not always easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not establish a state religion, but nevertheless be one “respecting” that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment, and hence offend the First Amendment.

Yeah, exactly! And also, huh?!

He quickly redeems himself, however, with that surprise judicial hit, “The Lemon Test” – the first of many to come from the Burger Court.

Also, it’s funny to say “Burger Court” and mean something totally for real and serious.

Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion… finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion”…

Or, rephrased to apply more specifically to the case at hand:

In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority…

Justice Burger goes on to explain how very clearly religious these private schools were. Most were located on the same grounds or in close proximity to associated churches. Religious symbols pervaded each campus. Roughly two-thirds of the instructors were nuns.

To cap it all off, the Catholic faith was pretty explicit about the fact that a large part of the reason they had parochial schools to begin with was to spread their faith. So are they religious? Is the Pope Cath-

Um… you probably get the idea.

But what about Allen a few years prior?

In Allen, the Court refused to make assumptions, on a meager record, about the religious content of the textbooks that the State would be asked to provide. We cannot, however, refuse here to recognize that teachers have a substantially different ideological character from books.

Good to know someone realizes that. Can we add “or online courses”?

In terms of potential for involving some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook’s content is ascertainable, but a teacher’s handling of a subject is not. We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college education. The conflict of functions inheres in the situation.

You gotta love a phrase like “the conflict of functions inheres in the situation.” And despite several more pages of explanation, that pretty much sums it up. The balance between pushing religion and punishing it is a tricky one, yes – but in this case, the Court decided, the state had some seriously conflicted inhering going on.

It wasn’t malicious. It wasn’t fair to expect teachers to completely separate their spiritual function from their secular labors.

We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First Amendment. We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.
Doctrines and faith are not inculcated or advanced by neutrals. With the best of intentions, such a teacher would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine…

Finally, expecting the state to supervise or punish violations of this unattainable “total separation” created the exact sort of entanglement the First Amendment hoped to circumvent. It made the government into the theology police.

To ensure that no trespass occurs, the State has therefore carefully conditioned its aid with pervasive restrictions…
Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.

So bus fare and math books are OK. Government-led prayer or devotional readings are not. And, after Lemon, direct support to sectarian schools – under whatever formula – is out as well.

On the other hand, I wish I were young enough to start a band just so I could call it the “Prophylactic Contacts.” But the conflict of functions would probably inhere in my situation.