Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994) – Part Three

I’m discovering as I continue to draft a follow-up to “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases that it’s more and more difficult to keep things succinct as subject matter nears the 21st century. I’m sharing a few rough drafts along the way partly in hopes a few of you, my Eleven Faithful Followers, might find them interesting, and partly because nothing highlights the problems in a text like posting it live for all the world to see.

Some version of this Talmudic Tale will likely be in the upcoming book. Chances are good, however, that the final results will be considerably more succinct.

Recap of Parts One & Two:  Kiryas Joel was (and is) a community of particularly insular Hasidic Jews (the Satmars) in New York. Most of their children attended private religious schools, but they asked the state for assistance providing care and education for their special needs children. Initial efforts to serve these particular children rand into conflict with recent Supreme Court rulings which struck down several public school efforts to serve high needs kids in religious institutions. New York responded by allowing the Satmars to create their own neighborhood and later a publicly funded neighborhood school tailored to their precise boundaries. The Supreme Court struck down this arrangement in a 6 – 3 decision, but even majority justices had differing ideas as to the specifics. The arrangement violated the Establishment Clause. Beyond that…

Satmar Students

Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence (and Advice Column)

Justice O’Connor (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), took the same “you know what you should have done?” approach as she had in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985):

The question at the heart of this case is: what may the government do, consistently with the Establishment Clause, to accommodate people’s religious beliefs? The history of the Satmars in Orange County is especially instructive on this, because they have been involved in at least three accommodation problems, of which this case is only the most recent…

O’Connor walked readers through these accommodations, lamenting the Court’s decisions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar along the way. It wasn’t a purely historical journey; she was leading up to something.

There is nothing improper about a legislative intention to accommodate a religious group, so long as it is implemented through generally applicable legislation. New York may, for instance, allow all villages to operate their own school districts. If it does not want to act so broadly, it may set forth neutral criteria that a village must meet to have a school district of its own; these criteria can then be applied by a state agency, and the decision would then be reviewable by the judiciary. 

A district created under a generally applicable scheme would be acceptable even though it coincides with a village which was consciously created by its voters as an enclave for their religious group. I do not think the Court’s opinion holds the contrary.

Want to guess how Kiryas Joel schools operate today? (Come on, take a guess!) It took a few versions before one eeked through federal court approval, but New York eventually figured out how to write a law that only applied to Kiryas Joel without mentioning anything in it that made it clear it could only apply to Kiryas Joel. Thanks, nice judge lady!

I also think there is one other accommodation that would be entirely permissible: the 1984 scheme, which was discontinued because of our decision in Aguilar. The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion. All handicapped children are entitled by law to government-funded special education… 

If the government provides this education on-site at public schools and at nonsectarian private schools, it is only fair that it provide it on-site at sectarian schools as well.

One almost gets the impression Aguilar was ripe for the overturnin’ – say, maybe… three years later?

Finally, O’Connor takes a detour down “Lemon Sucks” Lane:

One aspect of the Court’s opinion in this case is worth noting: Like the opinions in two recent cases, Lee v. Weisman (1992), Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist. (1993), and the case I think is most relevant to this one, Larson v. Valente (1982), the Court’s opinion does not focus on the Establishment Clause test we set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).

It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular clause. There is, after all, only one Establishment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause…  

But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different contexts… And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good. Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless…

It’s nice that O’Connor and Scalia had at least one subject on which they could agree. Speaking of which…

Justice Scalia’s Dissent

Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Antonin Scalia in his 6000+ word dissent, which led off with a Scalia’s characteristic venom, sarcasm, and intentional point-missing:

The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the Satmar Hasidim. I do not know who would be more surprised at this discovery: the Founders of our Nation or Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of the Satmar. The Grand Rebbe would be astounded to learn that, after escaping brutal persecution and coming to America with the modest hope of religious toleration for their ascetic form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so powerful, so closely allied with Mammon, as to have become an “establishment” of the Empire State. 

Even Scalia couldn’t have genuinely believed that the First Amendment only kicked in once an institution attained a specific number of members or reached a preset threshold of political power. Playing on the struggles of the Satmar to set up the straw argument that the issue was one of dominance over the rest of New York was disingenuous at best, red-meat ranting better suited to Fox News than the nation’s highest court. 

And the Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establishment Clause – which they designed “to insure that no one powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental power to punish dissenters” … has been employed to prohibit characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the religious practices (or more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a tiny minority sect. I, however, am not surprised. Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling religious toleration the establishment of religion.

Underneath the elitist spittle lies a potentially valid assertion – that the State in this case was simply accommodating a tiny religious group in a practical and neutral way, and that there was no reason to assume the New York Legislature wouldn’t treat others equitably as well. If they proceeded to violate that assumption, the courts would still be there. 

Scalia distinguished the political community of Kiryas Joel (which just happened to be full of Satmars) from the religious body of Satmars (who had chosen to live together in Kiryas Joel). A grant of governmental authority to the Satmars would be a potential constitutional violation, but a grant of local governmental authority to a community which just happens to share a religion was not. By the majority’s reasoning, Scalia argued – almost rationally – neither Utah nor New Mexico could have been admitted as States, given their respective monolithic cultures at the time. 

Like Abraham challenging God over the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, Justice Scalia proceeds to asks how many non-Satmars it would have taken for the arrangement to magically become constitutional. Two? Five? A dozen? For a moment, he struck a productive blend of snark and insight – an example of what the rest of his opinion could have accomplished if only he’d resisted the urge to disparage his colleagues personally while mocking their arguments like a middle schooler. 

JUSTICE SOUTER’s steamrolling of the difference between civil authority held by a church, and civil authority held by members of a church, is breathtaking. To accept it, one must believe that large portions of the civil authority exercised during most of our history were unconstitutional… The history of the populating of North America is in no small measure the story of groups of people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage striking out to form their own communities. It is preposterous to suggest that the civil institutions of these communities, separate from their churches, were constitutionally suspect…

I have little doubt that JUSTICE SOUTER would laud this humanitarian legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the students of Kiryas Joel were attributable to the fact that their parents were nonreligious commune dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies. The creation of a special, one-culture school district for the benefit of those children would pose no problem. The neutrality demanded by the Religion Clauses requires the same indulgence towards cultural characteristics that are accompanied by religious belief…

JUSTICE STEVENS’ statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of accommodation, and announces a positive hostility to religion – which, unlike all other noncriminal values, the state must not assist parents in transmitting to their offspring.

He’s a bit gentler on Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, each of whom agreed with at least part of his position in their concurrences. Unable to help himself, however, he blows past O’Connor’s criticism of the Lemon Test and focuses instead on the inadequacy of her solution: 

Unlike JUSTICE O’CONNOR… I would not replace Lemon with nothing, and let the case law “evolve” … To replace Lemon with nothing is simply to announce that we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any principle. The foremost principle I would apply is fidelity to the longstanding traditions of our people, which surely provide the diversity of treatment that JUSTICE O’CONNOR seeks, but do not leave us to our own devices.

Lest the reader forget his general disdain for the lesser beings Scalia was daily forced to endure, he concludes with a tidy little summary of the Court’s sins against reason, religion, and America:

The Court’s decision today is astounding. Chapter 748 involves no public aid to private schools, and does not mention religion. In order to invalidate it, the Court casts aside, on the flimsiest of evidence, the strong presumption of validity that attaches to facially neutral laws… 

This is unprecedented – except that it continues, and takes to new extremes, a recent tendency in the opinions of this Court to turn the Establishment Clause into a repealer of our Nation’s tradition of religious toleration. 

No doubt Scalia is somewhere complaining still, either about the shoddy harp-playing or the lack of air conditioning. Either way, he’s no doubt mocking former colleagues for their roles in the design. 

Aftermath

The Supremes would continue to struggle with the line between accommodating religious beliefs and facilitating them beyond constitutional boundaries. Usually, this would involve more familiar scenarios – allowing vouchers to be used at religious schools, arranging for students to lead collective prayer at school events, or including religious symbols in holiday arrangements on public lands.

The Court would also waver on the precise application and usefulness of the Lemon Test. Though criticized by many justices along the way, it continued to prove useful enough to at least work its way into the discussion more often than not. 

Kiryas Joel is still going strong, relatively speaking, and recently voted to separate itself even more completely from the Town of Monroe of which it was technically a part. As of 2019, Palm Tree is the first entirely ultra-orthodox town in the U.S.

Come On, You Were All Thinking It...

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part One

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part Two

RELATED POST: The Jehovah’s Witnesses Flag Cases – Part Two

Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994) – Part Two

I’m discovering as I continue to draft a follow-up to “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases that it’s more and more difficult to keep things succinct as subject matter nears the 21st century. I’m sharing a few rough drafts along the way partly in hopes a few of you, my Eleven Faithful Followers, might find them interesting, and partly because nothing highlights the problems in a text like posting it live for all the world to see.

Some version of this Talmudic Tale will likely be in the upcoming book. Chances are good, however, that the final results will be considerably more succinct – which is both necessary and a tiny bit sad.

Recap of Part One:  Kiryas Joel was (and is) a community of particularly insular Hasidic Jews (the Satmars) in New York. Most of their children attended private religious schools, but they asked the state for assistance providing care and education for their special needs children. Initial efforts to serve these particular children ran into conflict with recent Supreme Court rulings which struck down several public school efforts to serve high needs kids in religious institutions. New York responded by allowing the Satmars to create their own neighborhood and later a publicly funded neighborhood school tailored to their precise boundaries.  

As a practical matter, it certainly solved the problem. Constitutionally, on the other hand…

Kiryas Joel Students

Larkin v. Grendel’s Den (1982)

Just a decade before, the Supreme Court had ruled on a case having absolutely nothing to do with religious enclaves or public education, but which would nevertheless complicate the lives of the Satmars just as things were looking up for their special-needs kids. 

Many states have laws limiting certain types of businesses in proximity to local schools, churches, etc. While the underlying motivation is no doubt community standards with a side of morality (having a strip club next door might prove disruptive or horrifying to the average synagogue or daycare), these zoning restrictions are justified in the name of preserving property values and limiting the exposure of young people to drugs and alcohol or whatever. (Banning a nudie bar for being a nudie bar, on the other hand, would violate the First Amendment.) 

In the Massachusetts version, bars or other potentially seedy organizations were welcome to apply for state licensing wherever they liked. Churches or other specified organizations within a certain distance, however, had veto power over these applications. That way, if everyone was fine with a new business, the state wasn’t interfering. If someone objected, however, they’d simply reject the application. 

Grendel’s Den was a popular restaurant frequented by students and professors from nearby Harvard University. In the late 70s, they applied for a liquor license. It was rejected based solely on the objections of the Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Church, which was located literally next door. The restaurant sued, claiming this law was a violation of the Establishment Clause. They won the case in district court, and federal appeals court, all the way up to the Supremes where they won as well. 

The law would have been fine if it simply banned bars anywhere near churches. (Whether that’s good law or not wasn’t the point; it was constitutional.) But the state could not delegate any or all of its powers and responsibilities to religious institutions, the Court explained. In terms of the Lemon Test, that’s excessive entanglement. Religious people and organizations have the same voice as everyone else expressing their wishes to their representatives; they cannot, however, be appointed to replace them as lawmakers.

Was New York essentially doing the same thing with its solution to the Kiryas Joel dilemma? Was this unique arrangement basically handing over a state-funded public school to a religious group so they could run it as they saw fit?

The Decision(s)

Yes, yes it was. The Supreme Court determined in a 6 – 3 decision that New York had violated the Establishment Clause by making this arrangement, however well-intentioned it may have been. As to the specifics, however, the majority was somewhat divided. Justice David Souter wrote for the majority and was joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for all of it, and by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for most of it. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence, as did Justice O’Connor. His was brief; hers was not. Justice Stevens wrote a third concurrence in which he as joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, and Justice Kennedy wrote an entirely separate concurrence in which he supported the outcome but took a very different (and lonely) road to get there. (The dissent was much more united, as it often was when Justice Antonin Scalia was stomping around breaking things. Whether this indicates whole-hearted agreement or the other dissenters simply enjoyed watching him tilt at jurisprudential windmills is unclear.)

In short, there was only general agreement among the majority about why New York’s solution violated the Establishment Clause, but substantial agreement among the minority as to why the other six justices were big stupid poo-poo heads who hated Jesus and America. 

Justice Souter’s Majority (mostly, sort of) Opinion

Justice Souter wrote for the majority, such as it was. His argument had two primary points. 

First, the Constitution certainly allows states to accommodate religious needs by alleviating specific burdens. This particular legislation, however, shot past accommodation and right into establishment, all without seeking less entangled ways to accomplish the same thing. Instead, the state created what Souter called an impermissible “fusion” of governmental and religious functions as in Grendel’s Den

Second, accommodations for religious beliefs are generally constitutional if they apply equally to anyone with a similar claim or need. Refusal to take up arms and fight for one’s country, for example, is acceptable if based on deeply held religious or ethical beliefs – ANY deeply held religious or ethical beliefs. There was nothing in place to guarantee the next religious group unhappy with the education system would be granted their own public school to play with and bend to their will. This arrangement solely benefitted one religious group – the Satmars.

Concurrences (Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Blackmun)

Justice Kennedy concurred with the decision, but tied his objections to the initial drawing of political boundaries that allowed the Satmars to create their own little village. Had the exact same thing come about organically (as a result of voluntary associations and such), it would be fine. The intentional cooperation of the government in drawing the lines based on religion, however, he found problematic. 

Kennedy also lamented the interference of Grand Rapids and Aguilar in what might otherwise have been a workable solution – the public school “annex” for special needs kids operating right next to a Satmar private religious school. 

The decisions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar may have been erroneous. In light of the case before us, and in the interest of sound elaboration of constitutional doctrine, it may be necessary for us to reconsider them at a later date. A neutral aid scheme, available to religious and nonreligious alike, is the preferable way to address problems such as the Satmar handicapped children have suffered… But for Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Satmars would have had no need to seek special accommodations or their own school district. Our decisions led them to choose that unfortunate course, with the deficiencies I have described.

Justice Blackmun wrote a very brief concurrence merely to assert that despite not being explicitly relied upon in this case, the Lemon Test still rocked and screw the haters. (He put it a bit loftier than that.)

Justice Stevens was nearly as succinct, but his concurrence (joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg) took issue with the State’s decision to address the “panic, fear and trauma” experienced by special needs Satmar children in a public school setting by helping to re-insulate them, rather than teaching other children (and staff) how to respect their beliefs and needs. One major purpose of public schooling is to promote diversity and understanding, he argued, and this would have avoided constitutional messiness altogether. Instead, the state became an active participant in ensuring these children would remain Satmar, not by choice or informed consent as they aged, but by joining forces with their religious leaders to prevent them ever knowing the difference. 

The question of how far the state should go to assist religious parents in keeping their children shielded from understanding or interacting with people different from them is a biggie, and one many prefer not to talk about. The First Amendment prohibits government from promoting or discouraging a particular faith or the idea of faith in general. Public schools are founded on the understanding that civilization requires a common set of community values – mutual respect, communal responsibility, civic participation, etc. When religious values openly conflict with a core mission of public education, accommodation requires accepting that a percentage of the community is actively working against what’s best for the whole. That doesn’t necessarily mean the State should swoop in and free fundamentalist babies from their sectarian daycares, but it certainly runs counter to the idea taxpayers should actively assist efforts to keep them in their cultural cocoons. 

Satmar Male Boxes

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part One

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part Three

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Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994) – Part One

I’m discovering as I continue to draft a follow-up to “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases that it’s more and more difficult to keep things succinct as subject matter nears the 21st century. There’s so much relevant context for each case and potential applications are far more immediate… it’s difficult at times to know what’s essential and what’s not. 

I’m sharing a few rough drafts along the way partly in hopes a few of you, my Eleven Faithful Followers, might find them interesting, and partly because nothing highlights the problems in a text like posting it live for all the world to see. Some version of this material will likely be in the upcoming book. Chances are good, however, that the final results will be considerably more succinct – which is both necessary and a tiny bit sad. 

Getting Hasidic With It

Three Big Things:

1. In an effort to accommodate a particularly insular community of Hasidic Jews (the Satmars), the State of New York created a neighborhood and later a publicly funded neighborhood school tailored to their precise boundaries. Most children attended private religious schooling; the public school served only special needs kids from the Satmars and surrounding Hasidic communities. 

2. The Supreme Court found this to be a violation of the Establishment Clause, although admittedly not by much. The lines between accommodating religious beliefs and unconstitutionally supporting them were (and are) often complicated and difficult to agree upon.

3. Prior decisions regarding the “entanglement” of the State in religious education required reconsideration. There might actually be less mess and conflict in allowing states a bit more flexibility in how they managed their educational resources. 

Context

The circumstances of Kiryas Joel were unusual enough that the logistics themselves offer little to guide future students, parents, educators, or administrators. For anyone not living or working in a carefully constructed community of cultural outliers who end up with their own state-financed school district for special needs children, there seems (at first glance) to be little reason to devote more than a few lines to the case and its outcome.

And yet, taken in context, the case offers several points of interest and possible instruction – even for those uncertain what Hasidic Judaism even means

Kiryas Joel offered an interesting case study in the impact of unintended consequences as it struggled to reconcile recent precedent with the circumstances actually before the Court. Justices wrestled with the validity and usefulness of the “Lemon Test” as well as the appropriate lines between accommodating free exercise vs. propping up religion with State resources. Many of the issues involved were minor variations on those shaping the so-called “school choice” debate evolving at around the same time. It’s easy enough to distinguish between free exercise and establishment in theory, but when stirred together with the State’s vested interest in universal education, the rights of special needs children, religious tensions, economic realities, and a little political pragmatism, it’s all but impossible to meaningfully isolate either ideal. 

Finally, Justice Antonin Scalia yet again proved himself incapable of merely disagreeing with a decision or the reasoning behind it without sarcastically eviscerating everyone involved. In this case, however, Justice David Souter, writing for the majority (or at least the plurality – it’s complicated), rolled his rhetorical eyes and played the “there goes crazy Uncle Tony again” card. “Justice Scalia’s dissent is certainly the work of a gladiator…” he wrote, “but he thrusts at lions of his own imagining.”

So what happened in Kiryas Joel to spark this particular kerfuffle?

Background

Satmar Hasidic Judaism is a particularly strict branch of the faith which practices separation from the world and comes with its own religious laws and traditions. Members live in tight, crowded communities where they primarily speak Yiddish and avoid television, radio, newspapers, and the like. Men are in charge, no one uses birth control and, while peaceful, they don’t play well with others. On the other hand, they do rock their hat game. The modern shtreimel is simply fearless

Kiryas Joel is an enclave of Satmars in New York’s Hudson Valley. Property in the area was purchased by the Satmars in the 1970s for the sole purpose of forming this exclusive community; it was quickly filled and became largely self-sufficient. Children are educated in private yeshivas, where the focus was Jewish law and traditions. Most daily interactions are governed by Jewish law rather than the state. 

Like any community of 8,000 or so, a small percentage of Satmar children were special-needs. The Satmars weren’t going to win any participation trophies with larger society, but they paid their taxes like everyone else and asked the local school district to step up and help. For a community priding itself on isolationism, someone in the mix must have been aware of precedents like Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind (1986), Meek v. Pittenger (1975), Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), all the way back to Everson v. Board of Education (1947). (Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District was decided a year before Kiryas Joel, meaning the cases were working their ways through the system at roughly the same time.)

Also in the mix was the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) signed into law by President Ford a few years prior. IDEA was a well-intended piece of legislation which nevertheless created infinite logistical and economic nightmares for districts now required to provide intensive levels of service for a very small number of children while being slandered by the same lawmakers who passed it for not being more cost-effective – you know, like the private religious schools who aren’t bound to do anything they don’t feel like doing or accept anyone they don’t feel like accepting. 

In any case, Kiryas Joel was on firm constitutional ground making this particular request, and the local public school district readily complied. Initially this meant providing services in an annex attached to one of Kiryas Joel’s private religious institutions, an arrangement which was barely a year old when the Supreme Court announced its decisions in Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985) and Aguilar v. Felton (1985). In each of these cases, public school assistance to students in private religious institutions was ruled to violate the “excessive entanglement” part of the Lemon Test and thus ruled unconstitutional. So… time for Plan ‘B’, apparently. 

The district began transporting special needs Satmar kids off to their own facilities and continued to educate them there. The problem was, these public schools were, well… public – as in, they took all comers and did their best to make sure everyone got along and were treated more or less the same. With this came a certain lack of sensitivity to the ways of the Satmars, which may have reflected well-intentioned ignorance, a rejection of their culture as weird or undeserving of accommodation, or some combination of both. 

In any case, it didn’t go well. In one egregious example, the Hasidic kids were apparently taken to McDonald’s for lunch along with everyone else. (For those of you not rolling Hasidic, their menu isn’t exactly kosher.) In another, a disabled Satmar child was dressed up as Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer for a holiday pageant – another major no-no for super-conservative Jews, or… any Jews, really. 

These sorts of things would create issues for any child, but these were high-needs kids who weren’t always able to process the world at maximum efficiency anyway. Plus, they didn’t just come from a different faith – they came from an entirely different world. The people were different, the clothes were different, the dynamics and expectations and norms were all completely different. The Satmars quickly pulled their kids back out of Insane Heretic School, but were left with their original dilemma – how to afford special needs education for a few dozen kids. 

The State Legislature of New York, with the approval of Governor Mario Cuomo, offered a solution. They created a new school district whose boundaries just happened to correspond exactly with the village of Kiryas Joel. Now there was a public school composed entirely by Satmar kids. Theoretically this could have included any of them, but – wacky coincidence – only the special needs kids’ families opted to have them attend. As it turned out, another few dozen came from outside the village, making a total school population of around 40. 

As a practical matter, it certainly solved the problem. Constitutionally, on the other hand…

I Told You The Hats Rocked

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part Two

RELATED POST: Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) – Part Three

RELATED POST: A Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

When Jesus Needs A Visitor’s Badge: Church-State Issues In Public Education

A “Hall of Separation”

That’s a horrible title and I wish I could stop thinking it’s not.

As you probably know, given that it’s pretty much all I talk about these days, I’ve been researching Supreme Court cases involving issues of church-state separation in relation to public education. My hope is to have something ready before the entire system collapses and any benefit one may derive from it is no longer relevant.

Map AnalysisGiven the state of the 2020 elections as I post this, I’m probably way too late.

Nevertheless, I’ve been wrong before. Democracy may cough and bleed its way through another generation or so in some form, in which case I may sell as many as eleven copies of this lil’ liber sui generis. A few people may even find it helpful, enlightening – or at least mildly diverting.

Who am I kidding with all the humility? So far, it’s bloody brilliant and everyone will want seven copies just to show off.

In the meantime, I thought I’d share three of the books I’ve been reading as I continue researching my own. While the cases I’m including aren’t exactly obscure or difficult to document (most reached the Supreme Court, after all), the issues involved are often less universal than most “landmark” cases. Plus, as the subject suggests, most involve religion on some level. That means that while my trademark wit and brilliance will no doubt still prove engaging – perhaps even illuminating – it’s nevertheless important I make a genuine effort to incorporate other points of view than my own and a wider array of interpretations and contextualization.

After all, just because someone doesn’t share the same political ideals or personal theology as myself doesn’t mean they don’t deserve consideration and respect as a potential buyer. It all spends the same, kids.

While you eagerly await my own contribution to the field, here are three titles you should seriously consider if you’re even remotely interested in church-state relations as they pertain to public education – or even if you just want to look impressive with your reading choices over the holidays.

Have a Little Faith: Religion, Democracy, and the American Public School (History and Philosophy of Education Series), Benjamin Justice & Colin Macleod (University of Chicago Press, 2016)

The lessons of philosophy and the lessons of history bring us to the same place: resolving religious controversies in public schools must proceed from an informed understanding of the role of public schools as legitimate sites of civic education, where children learn to become reasonable citizens of a religiously pluralistic society.

This rather bold little volume seeks to unravel the history, as well as the social and political dynamics, of public education’s rocky relationship with faith in the United States. While Justice and Macleod are clearly not fans of turning public dollars or control over to narrowly focused factions, neither are they seeking to exclude those voices from the conversation. As they write in the introduction:

{W}e think that public education can serve democracy by helping citizens to reason with one another respectfully and productively, and to understand the complex ways that different faith perspectives (including those that reject religion) inform the lives of citizens.

They structure their case in two ways. First, the book is divided into historical eras – the Founding Fathers as they wrestled with the mix of religion and public education, the 19th century, the “Era of Progress” (roughly the Second Industrial Revolution and the Progressive Era), the 1960s and thereafter, and sample issues from the 21st century. Within this structure, they expertly walk the reader through history, educational practices, religious evolution in the U.S., and the various ways in which these elements intersect, with a focus on what they call “legitimacy.”

Have A Little Faith

A diverse citizenry, they argue, is more likely to support outcomes they believe have both procedural legitimacy (they’re the result of fair procedures and democratic processes, even if not everyone loves the results) and substantive legitimacy (they demonstrate a good faith effort to accommodate the many voices involved in the process, even those in the minority). A religious community might accept that there will be no formal prayer at high school graduation if the process leading to that decision is transparent and the reasoning behind it is consistent with their understanding of how society is supposed to work. The same decision made without clarity as to why or how, or expressed in a way which seems contradictory to their understanding of the system, is more likely to provoke outrage and overt resistance. (I’m oversimplifying, but that’s the general idea.)

In short, then, what Justice and Macleod want is for the debate to be more informed on all sides – resolved by local boards and communities more often than by district courts or D.C. They get there through the best summary I’ve ever read of the history of public education – locally or nationally – as a function of collective needs and individual values. Having taught American History for so many years, I felt like I already had a pretty good grasp on the general educational trends and shifting social dynamics of the past few centuries, but the authors manage to highlight specific movements and interest groups that helped complete some of the connections I’d previously overlooked, as well as numerous other bits and pieces of history and culture. All in all, it’s a fascinating zoom-in on the past two centuries.

Justice and Macleod largely maintain the tone of researchers and advocates for improvement without obviously partisan political agendas, but by default this means readers with specific crusades in mind won’t find much to back them up in these pages. Advocates for public education may find themselves challenged, but most will also find some foundational convictions and ideologies validated along the way – not by mindless recitation of platitudes, but through balanced elucidation of history and founding principles as understood by those who first wrote them down. Even readers interested in “education reform” or convinced we need to reclaim “government schools” from the clutches of atheism and anti-Americanism may find insight and clarity here – minus the sort of “red meat” of which many have grown fond.

All in all, there’s a LOT of history and insight and challenge packed in to a relatively short, easy-to-read text. The authors seem to think we have every reason to be hopeful and that we’re perfectly capable of doing better. I hope they’re right.

Holy Hullabaloos: A Road Trip to the Battlegrounds of the Church/State Wars, Jay Wexler (2009)

Holy HullabaloosThis is not a comprehensive survey of church-state cases which have reached the Supreme Court in the past generation. Instead, Wexler selects a half-dozen cases which illustrate the complications inherent in applying the two religion clauses of the First Amendment to real life. He does a masterful job of reminding us of the very real people and situations behind the decisions, and dispels several common illusions about their goals and beliefs along the way.

Wexler offers valuable insights and analyses with a natural, comfortable humor – making this a very readable, relatable book despite some legitimately thorny topics. While he borders on name-dropping along the way, this can be forgiven since in real life he is apparently actually kind of a big deal. In fact, it’s possible that it’s not name-dropping at all so much as my own personal jealousy at the list of folks whose apartments and workplaces he references as part of this exceptional travelogue.

It’s also really, really funny in all the most accessible and respectful ways. That may be part of my jealousy as well.

School Prayer: The Court, the Congress, and the First Amendment, Robert S. Alley (1994)

The first few chapters of Alley’s book are devoted to the history behind the precise wording of the First Amendment’s two “religion” clauses, with a natural focus on James Madison.

School Prayer R.S. Alley

The rest of the work jumps to the 20th century, especially the latter half (after Engel v. Vitale and Abington v. Schempp in the early 1960s), and a series of Presidential efforts and Congressional machinations to more openly label the U.S. as proudly and historically Protestant – and a fairly orthodox flavor, at that. A handful of relevant Supreme Court cases are addressed, but primarily in terms of legislative reaction and the various discussions and factions involved in trying to find a path around the Court’s interpretations of the Establishment Clause.

It was often closer than one might think.

The book ends in the early 1990s, meaning many of the most important cases from a contemporaneous perspective hadn’t happened yet (Lee v. Weisman is the last case covered in the book; Santa Fe ISD v. Doe wasn’t until 2000). Nevertheless, this book is a surprisingly readable and engaging journey through one of the most foundational debates in American history and culture – what role should faith play in a nation claiming to offer freedom of religion but at the same time so clearly founded in some sort of vaguely Protestant (almost non-sectarian, but not quite) “American Christianity”?

The book is rational and researched, so it naturally leans a bit left. Nevertheless, like the Justice & Macleod book, it offers a fascinating overview of a specific issue in American history over time.

Conclusion

At the moment, the status of our nation, whatever values we’re going to claim moving forward, or the actual role and reliability of our Supreme Court is all up in the air. One of the common themes I’ve discovered among Trump supporters over the past few years is their unshakable faith that nothing the President says or does, Congress says or does, or the Supreme Court says or does, can actually damage the nation in any permanent way because… America! They genuinely believe we are supernaturally invulnerable to any violation of our laws, traditions, values, or institutions, as if there’s a distinct, concrete idea of “America” that doesn’t rely on anyone actually maintaining or believing anything to remain omnipotent and eternal.

I find this conviction completely bewildering.

Because of that, I’ve had trouble knowing whether there’s a point to even finishing the book, given how quickly the precedents and procedures therein are likely to become entirely irrelevant moving forward as we move into an age of Rule by Shut-Up-Snowflake-I’m-Making-$(#&-Up-Over-Here!  I’m pushing ahead, however, largely because I’m not sure how long it will take for the system to actually collapse and because – full transparency – I don’t have any better ideas.

That means that you, my Eleven Faithful Followers, are probably stuck with at least another six months of me talking about this stuff, whether anyone other than me cares or not. Thanks for sticking around.

RELATED POST: A Moment Of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

RELATED POST: “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases (Promo & Supplementals)

Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools (The Tale of the Troubling Textbook) – Part Four

Good Evening, I’m Pierce Lively…

Winter Is ComingIf you’re interested in far more concise case summaries accompanied by pithy-but-97%-sociopolitically-fair-and-balanced insights, check out “Have To” History: Landmark Supreme Court Cases. If you’re specifically interested in the “wall of separation” as applied to public education, well… I’m working on that one. Along the way, however, I’ve indulged myself in the minutiae of a case from Tennessee which took up about half of the 1980s bouncing around the courts. It was called Mozert v. Hawkins Board of Education, and its life ended in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1987.

The case centered around the question of whether the district violated the free exercise rights of a small group of fundamentalist parents when they refused to let their children opt out of reading from the same literature textbook as everyone else. The parents found the stories offensive – at least collectively. The textbook’s editors seemed to have intentionally woven a doctrine of tolerance for other cultures and faiths, a belief in imagination and questioning our own assumptions, and getting along with the rest of the world – heresies unacceptable to these devout.

In Part One I covered the origins of the case and the district court’s initial dismissal of the parents’ concerns. Most of their complaints didn’t reach the required threshold for constitutional consideration, and the one which did – that the school was too neutral toward religion and not deferential enough toward theirs – didn’t strike him as radiating with merit.

Part Two covered the Sixth Circuit’s finding that the district court judge was a slacker and needed to give these folks a proper hearing because of all the legitimate constitutional and factual concerns involved, by golly!

This was some of the free exercise being violated...In Part Three, we picked up on some interesting details from the district court’s far more detailed analysis of the situation (after having hearings and everything!) and I went off on a bit of a tear about the conflict between certain schools of conservative thought and that schools should be willing to let a few parents be upset from time to time when it serves the larger good of society and the best interests of their kids.

Come at me, OCPA.

Now it’s time to bring this baby home. At some point, after all, I’m going to need to condense it to about a page and a half if it even survives the process long enough to merit inclusion in the book.

Mozert v. Hawkins (1987) – Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

The Sixth Circuit originally sent the case back to Judge Hull in the Eastern District of Tennessee for more thorough consideration. When he reversed himself and found in favor of the parents, the district appealed the case back to the Sixth – which promptly overturned Hull’s revised decision.

Stop Judging Me! Oh, Wait...I assume that goes with the gig and that judges don’t take this stuff personally, but I’d have used bad words and probably thrown my gavel through the wall.

Chief Judge Pierce Lively wrote the majority opinion. Also, there’s never been a cooler name in American jurisprudential history than “Pierce Lively.”

He almost immediately included a bit of context not made clear in earlier opinions but which certainly makes some of the school’s stubbornness about everyone using the same book a bit more understandable:

Early in 1983 the Hawkins County, Tennessee Board of Education adopted the Holt, Rinehart and Winston basic reading series… for use in grades 1-8 of the public schools of the county… In grades 5-8, reading is taught as a separate subject at a designated time in each class. However, the schools maintain an integrated curriculum which requires that ideas appearing in the reading programs reoccur in other courses. By statute public schools in Tennessee are required to include “character education” in their curricula. The purpose of this requirement is “to help each student develop positive values and to improve student conduct as students learn to act in harmony with their positive values and learn to become good citizens in their school, community, and society.”

Apparently those teachers who were finding it difficult to maintain two separate curriculums – one for the majority, and one with nothing pushing character or empathy or imagination – weren’t just being lazy slugs after all! The state expected them to weave godless socialism positive values into the entire school day, and regular references to the stories they’d been reading together were part of that.

I don’t know who got the crazy idea that education shouldn’t be a segmented series of unrelated subjects, but that’s Tennessee for you.

Like many school systems, Hawkins County schools teach “critical reading” as opposed to reading exercises that teach only word and sound recognition. “Critical reading” requires the development of higher order cognitive skills that enable students to evaluate the material they read, to contrast the ideas presented, and to understand complex characters that appear in reading material…

Killer Vicky FrostWhoa there, tiger – I thought this was school! No one wants you teaching my kids to think for themselves. That’s why they’ve got me! (OK, that’s not entirely fair. Even the fundamentalists agreed in theory that they wanted their kids to practice critical thinking and such. It’s just that it was supposed to always lead to the same, predetermined outcomes.)

Winter Is Coming

Vicki Frost was the first witness for the plaintiffs and she presented the most complete explanation of the plaintiffs’ position…

I’ll bet she did. Do you sense a touch of euphemizing here?

Mrs. Frost testified that she had spent more than 200 hours reviewing the Holt series and had found numerous passages that offended her religious beliefs. She stated that the offending materials fell into seventeen categories which she listed…

That would win the ribbon for “most complete” alright.

And if you leave out every third 'e'...200 hours is equivalent to five weeks of full-time employment doing nothing but finding things wrong with a middle school literature textbook. I actually have a copy of this reader (I tracked it down when I started reading about this case) and I’m not sure there’s 200 hours worth of analysis IN it. The average adult could read it cover to cover in a day, and none of the stories, plays, or poems are particularly complex.

I wonder if she played some of them backwards to see what it sounded like they were saying that way?

I won’t even address “seventeen categories.” There shouldn’t be seventeen categories of anything. Ever.

These ranged from such familiar concerns of fundamentalist Christians as evolution and “secular humanism” to less familiar themes such as “futuristic supernaturalism,” pacifism, magic and false views of death.

“Less familiar themes”? *snort* Well-played by the aptly named Judge Pierce Lively! One can’t help but picture the other parents trying to look stoic and supportive as she explains this to the court. Then again, to be fair, even today students are being unfairly corrupted by things like futuristic supernaturalism or immunization against polio.

Although the opinion goes on for quite a few more pages, you can pretty much tell the court’s ultimate decision simply by the examples it cites and the way in which it cites them. For example:

In her lengthy testimony—

Hey, now – she spent 200 hours filing these horrors into 17 categories. Let’s cut her a little slack, shall we?

Dangerous One World ToleranceIn her lengthy testimony Mrs. Frost identified passages from stories and poems used in the Holt series that fell into each category. Illustrative is her first category, futuristic supernaturalism, which she defined as teaching “Man As God.” Passages that she found offensive described Leonardo da Vinci as the human with a creative mind that “came closest to the divine touch.” Similarly, she felt that a passage entitled “Seeing Beneath the Surface” related to an occult theme, by describing the use of imagination as a vehicle for seeing things not discernible through our physical eyes.

Yeah, even if the court chose to save the actual decision for the end, by this stage the lawyers and most of the parents had to have known it was over. One can only assume Mrs. Frost at this point started compiling the things wrong with this verdict into some other prime number of categories…

Imagine

She interpreted a poem, “Look at Anything,” as presenting the idea that by using imagination a child can become part of anything and thus understand it better. Mrs. Frost testified that it is an “occult practice” for children to use imagination beyond the limitation of scriptural authority.

Don't read the inside of the box!Here’s where I confess I’m a bit confused. Not at Mrs. Frost – there are always a handful like her out there fighting principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in children’s poems – but at the other parents and the legal team. There’s a case to be made that the textbook has a New Age-y, “One World” slant to it. But no reasonable adult can think they’re going to convince a federal judge that fostering imagination in children is essentially promoting the occult.

Be the staunchly religious and you might have a chance (just ask the Amish). Be the crazy fringe group and probably not.

She testified that the story that alerted her to the problem with the reading series fell into the category of futuristic supernaturalism. Entitled “A Visit to Mars,” the story portrays thought transfer and telepathy in such a way that “it could be considered a scientific concept,” according to this witness. This theme appears in the testimony of several witnesses, i.e., the materials objected to “could” be interpreted in a manner repugnant to their religious beliefs.

Ouch. There’s a second nail in the coffin. The material “could be” interpreted in such and such way. That hovers dangerously close to those arguments you have right before the divorce. “Yeah, but it’s HOW you said it, @#$*%&!”

She admitted that the textbooks contained a disclaimer that evolution is a theory, not a proven scientific fact. Nevertheless, she felt that references to evolution were so pervasive and presented in such a factual manner as to render the disclaimer meaningless.

That’s what – nail three or so?

The Magic Flout

Another witness for the plaintiffs was Bob Mozert, father of a middle school and an elementary school student in the Hawkins County system. His testimony echoed that of Vicki Frost in large part, though his answers to questions tended to be much less expansive. He also found objectionable passages in the readers that dealt with magic, role reversal or role elimination…

“Much less expansive” – *snort* – Pierce, you cad!

This is the guy whose name is on the case. Surely his objections will prove a bit more palatable.

…particularly biographical material about women who have been recognized for achievements outside their homes…

Mozert Man Hand (The Regrettes)Or not.

Then again, he didn’t go after Anne Frank as a corrupting influence, so he’s still gonna have to settle for the silver.

Let’s cut to the decision stuff:

The first question to be decided is whether a governmental requirement that a person be exposed to ideas he or she finds objectionable on religious grounds constitutes a burden on the free exercise of that person’s religion as forbidden by the First Amendment…

The complaint mentioned only the textbooks that the students were required to read. It did not seek relief from any method of teaching the material… The plaintiffs did not produce a single student or teacher to testify that any student was ever required to affirm his or her belief or disbelief in any idea or practice mentioned in the various stories and passages contained in the Holt series. However, the plaintiffs appeared to assume that materials clearly presented as poetry, fiction and even “make-believe” in the Holt series were presented as facts which the students were required to believe. Nothing in the record supports this assumption.

That’s nail four.

Vicki Frost testified that an occasional reference to role reversal, pacifism, rebellion against parents, one-world government and other objectionable concepts would be acceptable, but she felt it was the repeated references to such subjects that created the burden. The district court suggested that it was a matter of balance, apparently believing that a reading series that presented ideas with which the plaintiffs agree in juxtaposition to those with which they disagree would pass constitutional muster…

However, the plaintiffs’ own testimony casts serious doubt on their claim that a more balanced presentation would satisfy their religious views. Mrs. Frost testified that it would be acceptable for the schools to teach her children about other philosophies and religions, but… then her children “would have to be instructed to {the} error {of the other philosophy}.” It is clear that to the plaintiffs there is but one acceptable view–the Biblical view, as they interpret the Bible…

Elmo Wonders What's Up With That Frost ChickHave you noticed that while the arguments made other parents or their lawyers are periodically referenced by way of context and summarizing the issues, every explanation as to why there’s no way they’re going to win this case starts with “Vicki First testified that…”?

Clearly she left a strong impression.

Mrs. Frost testified that many political issues have theological roots and that there would be “no way” certain themes could be presented without violating her religious beliefs. She identified such themes as evolution, false supernaturalism, feminism, telepathy and magic as matters that could not be presented in any way without offending her beliefs. The only way to avoid conflict with the plaintiffs’ beliefs in these sensitive areas would be to eliminate all references to the subjects so identified. However, the Supreme Court has clearly held that it violates the Establishment Clause to tailor a public school’s curriculum to satisfy the principles or prohibitions of any religion. (Epperson v. Arkansas, 1968).

Three Cases, Three Strikes

Let’s skip ahead a bit. At this point, ol’ Pierce Lively truly hits his stride. Other than some strategic editing to tighten things up, I’ll shut up and let him bring it all home.

{T}he plaintiffs… have relied particularly upon three Supreme Court decisions. We find them all distinguishable.

The issue in Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), was whether a state could deny public office to a person solely because of the person’s refusal to declare a belief in God… Since there was no evidence that the plaintiff students were ever required to profess or deny a religious belief the issue in Torcaso simply is not presented by the instant case.

Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), grew out of a school board rule that required all schools to make a salute to the flag and a pledge of allegiance a regular part of their daily program… The plaintiff was a Jehovah’s Witness who considered the flag an “image” which the Bible forbids worshiping in any way. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, stated:

Here, … we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means… It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and attitude of mind.

It is abundantly clear that the exposure to materials in the Holt series did not compel the plaintiffs to “declare a belief,” “communicate by word and sign {their} acceptance” of the ideas presented, or make an “affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.” …

The third Supreme Court decision relied upon by the plaintiffs is the only one that might be read to support the proposition that requiring mere exposure to materials that offend one’s religious beliefs creates an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion. {In} Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)… {t}he plaintiff parents… were Old Order Amish and members of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, who objected to their children being required to attend either public or private schools beyond the eighth grade… Unlike the plaintiffs in the present case, the parents in Yoder did not want their children to attend any high school or be exposed to any part of a high school curriculum. The Old Order Amish and the Conservative Amish Mennonites separate themselves from the world and avoid assimilation into society, and attempt to shield their children from all worldly influences…

The parents in Yoder were required to send their children to some school that prepared them for life in the outside world, or face official sanctions. The parents in the present case want their children to acquire all the skills required to live in modern society. They also want to have them excused from exposure to some ideas they find offensive. Tennessee offers two options to accommodate this latter desire. The plaintiff parents can either send their children to church schools or private schools, as many of them have done, or teach them at home…

The lesson is clear: governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise. An actual burden on the profession or exercise of religion is required.

In short, distinctions must be drawn between those governmental actions that actually interfere with the exercise of religion, and those that merely require or result in exposure to attitudes and outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion…

Holy Rollers I lied, I will add one more comment. The court moves from why the three cases cited by the parents don’t apply to addressing the more general issue at the heart of this case – the role of public schools in serving society as a whole, not just select parts of it. Pierce Lively was as succinct and stirring as anyone on the highest bench had ever managed:

The Supreme Court has recently affirmed that public schools serve the purpose of teaching fundamental values “essential to a democratic society.” These values “include tolerance of divergent political and religious views” while taking into account “consideration of the sensibilities of others.” (Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 1986). The Court has noted with apparent approval the view of some educators who see public schools as an “assimilative force” that brings together “diverse and conflicting elements” in our society “on a broad but common ground” (Ambach v. Norwick, 1979, citing works of J. Dewey, N. Edwards and H. Richey)…

Mrs. Frost stated specifically that she objected to stories that develop “a religious tolerance that all religions are merely different roads to God.” Stating that the plaintiffs reject this concept, presented as a recipe for an ideal world citizen, Mrs. Frost said, “We cannot be tolerant in that we accept other religious views on an equal basis with ours.” While probably not an uncommon view of true believers in any religion, this statement graphically illustrates what is lacking in the plaintiffs’ case.

How ironic would it be if I shouted “Amen!” at this point?

The “tolerance of divergent … religious views” referred to by the Supreme Court is a civil tolerance, not a religious one. It does not require a person to accept any other religion as the equal of the one to which that person adheres. It merely requires a recognition that in a pluralistic society we must “live and let live.” If the Hawkins County schools had required the plaintiff students either to believe or say they believe that “all religions are merely different roads to God,” this would be a different case. No instrument of government can, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, require such a belief or affirmation. However, there was absolutely no showing that the defendant school board sought to do this; indeed, the school board agreed at oral argument that it could not constitutionally do so.

Looking Over The WallPrint this up and distribute it to every school board, judge, right wing talking head, or believer with a persecution complex. Think of how many problems we could solve if we had general understanding and agreement of this bit alone.

Instead, the record in this case discloses an effort by the school board to offer a reading curriculum designed to acquaint students with a multitude of ideas and concepts, though not in proportions the plaintiffs would like. While many of the passages deal with ethical issues, on the surface at least, they appear to us to contain no religious or anti-religious messages. Because the plaintiffs perceive every teaching that goes beyond the “three Rs” as inculcating religious ideas, they admit that any value-laden reading curriculum that did not affirm the truth of their beliefs would offend their religious convictions.

Now things are getting jurisprudential and intense. Better yet, we’re done with the bizarro world of Vicki Frost and her 17 categories.

Although it is not clear that the plaintiffs object to all critical reading, Mrs. Frost did testify that she did not want her children to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible provides the answer…

Or maybe we’re not. It doesn’t matter. Let’s focus on that part about “it’s a civic tolerance, not a religious one.” That’s the hit single we turn up and sing along with in the shower.

The case produced a concurring opinion as well as a dissent – which is a lot of variation when you consider that there were only three judges involved. Both are interesting in their own way, but I think I’ve done enough damage on this one for now.

It’s time to get back to the serious stuff, like why Bridget Mergens should be allowed to have a Bible Club after school. Besides, the religious folks were honestly due for a win, and in Mergens Battles The Big Bad Godless Public School System, they get one.

Where The Occultic Beasts Are