The Year Cecil Rhodes Kicked My *** (Part Two)

NOTE: If you haven’t read Part One of this mess, you should probably start there.

Cecil Rhodes sitting comfortably on his porchThere were essentially four major players in Africa in the latter half of the nineteenth century, at least in terms of our broad, offensively simplistic overview.

The first was the Africans themselves. Now, contrary to popular western belief, Africa was (and is) an entire continent, not a country. It contained (and contains) numerous cultures and distinct nations, each with their own values and priorities. Nevertheless, we’re going to risk treating the entire native population as a single entity in terms of the era’s global dynamics. This is not intended to reduce or disparage those thus generalized; it’s a necessary simplification for purposes of a particular narrative. Like the Amerindian population of North America upon the arrival of European colonists or the governments of South America during the Age of Imperialism, we’re temporarily telling the story through the eyes of those who saw little reason to distinguish between those in their way. King Lobengula was the rule of the Matabele people (also called the Ndebele) during the Rhodes years. While he didn’t represent all Africans, he’s an appropriate personification of the southernmost quarter of the continent at this time.

The second group in our little story was the Boers, sometimes referred to as the Afrikaners. These stubborn homesteaders had begun settling the Cape of Good Hope in the mid-seventeenth century, arriving primarily from the Netherlands (the “Dutch”) but including a number of French Huguenots (Protestants who fled France to avoid persecution), some disaffected Germans, and a smattering of other Europeans. The Boers were primarily farmers, and many either brought slaves with them to assist in this endeavor or enslaved the locals as opportunities allowed. When the British showed up in 1795 and claimed that part of Africa for themselves, the Boer migrated northeast (the “Great Trek”), eventually founding two distinct Boer Republics – Transvaal and the Orange Free State. (If you look at a modern map of Africa, these covered roughly the northeastern half of what is now South Africa.) The Boer farmed, fought with indigenous locals, and resented the British for a century or so until defeated in the Second Boer War (1899-1902), after which British domination in the area was essentially uncontested until the mid-twentieth century and the establishment of South Africa as an independent republic. Paul Kruger was president of the Transvaal Republic for nearly two decades and often serves as the face of the Boers in historical narrative.

The third player in our drama was, of course, the British Empire, which reached its zenith around 1913 (just before World War I). While far from the only imperialistic nation of its age, it was arguably the most effective. By the early twentieth century, Great Britain controlled something like a quarter of the globe, leading someone to note that “the sun never sets on the British empire” – it was literally always daytime somewhere under its control. Imperialism was about more than global one-upmanship (although that was certainly a biggie.) It was about natural resources and cultural domination and national security and elbow room and somewhere to send undesirables and markets and the white man’s burden. During the infamous “carving up” of Africa (1884-1885) by various European powers, the U.S., and a handful of others who met in Berlin, Great Britain claimed not only the Cape of Good Hope it had already effectively taken over from the Boers, but the Transvaal and Orange Free State regions and a few other choice bits in the area as well.

The fourth and final figure is, of course Cecil Rhodes.

1880 – 1885

Cecil Rhodes began his political career by winning a seat as a parliamentary representative in the Cape Colony’s legislature, the House of Assembly. While local concerns and circumstances drove the specifics, Rhodes was from the beginning interested in northern expansion. Trying to distinguish between his personal ambitions, his belief in British cultural supremacy, and his desire to exploit the natural resources of the African continent is pointless, since to Rhodes these were inextricable elements of the same worldview.

A territory then known as Basutoland, nestled just south of the Orange Free State and today the enclave of Lesotho, was pushing back against British rule. The inhabitants were primarily native Africans who had only a few generations before began incorporating horses and guns into their self-defense strategies. The British had already asserted legislative control over the region against its will and had more recently initiated a policy of complete disarmament of the local population in the name of “preserving the peace.” Needless to say, this didn’t go well.

Rhodes managed to advocate on behalf of the native African population of Basutoland while still promoting long-term British interests. He established good relationships with a number of Boer leaders to the north and encouraged Great Britain to establish a protectorate over Bechuanaland, a territory overlapping parts of the northernmost section of modern South Africa and most of Botswana.

The infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 which formally unleashed the “Scramble for Africa” was a few years away, but other European powers were already competing for influence in the uncharted interior regions of Africa. The government of the Cape Colony (still largely overseen by the British) lacked real influence that far north and Rhodes often grew frustrated at his inability to convey Africa’s potential importance to the imperial government back home. He thus used whatever tools he had at his disposal to continue nudging British influence forward. It made little difference to Rhodes whether those in his way were accommodated or assimilated as long as British influence could expand, telegraph lines could be laid, and reliable railroads could be built. By all accounts, he genuinely believed this was what was best not only for his countrymen, but for the world and its inhabitants in general.

Just past Basutoland were Mashonaland and Matabeleland, both part of what would later be named Rhodesia (one of two African countries eventually named after Rhodes) and today make up roughly the northwestern half of Zimbabwe. In addition to forming a critical link in his envisioned unification of Africa under the guidance of enlightened British rule, both territories contained potential mineral wealth – a handy way to pay for all this expansion and improvement. Unlike with Basutoland, the primary obstacles Rhodes faced came from the Boers rather than the original inhabitants. Rhodes managed to get himself appointed to a committee established to sort out boundary disputes with the Boers and once again used political maneuvering as his primary method of conquest. It seems unlikely, however, that any of those involved could have completely ignored the might of the British empire hovering nearby.

It was during this period that Rhodes first met Paul Kruger, president of the Transvaal. Like Rhodes, Kruger had visions of an “improved” Africa. Unlike Rhodes, he had the backing of a people who, while not exactly native, had been on the continent for centuries at that point. The Boer were well-established and largely accepted as part of the landscape, often referring to themselves simply as Afrikaners – literally, “Africans.” Kruger attempted to extend the protection of the Boer to several small republics within the disputed territories, forcing the British-backed government of the Cape Colony to commit troops to ensuring this didn’t happen.

The two men finally met in February 1885, at a conference intended to resolve the ongoing conflicts between the Boer and the British. Rhodes and Kruger were too similar to reach any sort of personal peace, but their respective governments managed to carve out a few compromises. Rhodes, who’d intended for the Cape Colony to eventually annex the Bechuanaland, resigned in protest when it became clear this wasn’t in the cards.

1886 – 1890

The diamond mines of Kimberley were still going strong in 1886 when gold was discovered in the area as well. Rhodes by this point had a complete monopoly over the mineral wealth being produced. His average annual income was estimated to be around £500,000, roughly $60 million per year in modern American dollars. Not surprisingly, this made Rhodes one of the richest men on earth, giving him extensive leverage and substantial resources for his ongoing push to absorb as much of Africa as possible into the British Empire.

Kimberley wasn’t the only area in which gold was being unearthed. The Witwatersrand Gold Rush in the Transvaal Republic occurred around the same time, leading to the establishment of Johannesburg and continuing the massive transformations of southern Africa which began in Kimberley. The “mineral revolution” which proved so profitable to Rhodes and company was further fueled by events in Witwatersrand and eventually led to both the industrialization of what became South Africa and the system of apartheid which dominated the region for most of the twentieth century.

Rhodes sat out the rush into Transvaal, instead biding his time in hopes of even greater profits further north. In addition to the ongoing inconvenience of Paul Kruger and the Boer supporting him, Rhodes was now confronted with King Lobengula of Matabele. Lobengula was savvy enough to realize he couldn’t take on the concentrated might of the British Empire and relied instead on diplomatic maneuvering and stubborn diplomacy.

The king had previously rejected the efforts of Kruger to secure mining concessions in Matabeleland, believing that once he let in even a few white men, it was unlikely he’d ever be able to get rid of them. Now, faced with two competing outsiders, Lobengula chose what seemed like the lesser of the two evils and signed a treaty with Kruger’s Transvaal Republic in 1887.

Rhodes had up to this point been unable to persuade the British government to support expanded colonization of South Africa. Now, however, he had a new card to play. The Boer were expanding their influence into Matabeleland and Mashonaland (much like their cousins in the United States, the British often misunderstood the dynamics of political leadership among the native populations and assumed whatever “chief” they dealt with spoke for everyone with a comparable skin tone anywhere in the region) and now that the “Scramble for Africa” was fully underway, a half-dozen other European powers were quickly sizing up their opportunities on the continent as well. If Great Britain wasn’t willing to amp up its imperialism based solely on South Africa’s potential merits, perhaps they’d do so in order to prevent others from doing the same.

In the meantime, Rhodes secured the support of John Moffet, a missionary and the son of Robert and Mary Moffet, whose missionary work in Africa had secured them the trust and friendship of King Lobengula. (One of John’s sisters was Mary Livingstone, wife of Dr. David Livingstone, the missionary and explorer famously “lost” for six years until his encounter with reporter Henry Stanley who famously greeted him with “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”) Lobengula trusted Moffet and signed over what he understood to be rights only for the white men to do some digging. Instead, as is so often the case when white men and treaties are involved, the small print opened the door for Rhodes and the British to pretty much come in and do as they pleased anywhere in the kingdom.

When Moffet realized how he’d been used, he turned against Rhodes, but at that point it no longer mattered. In 1888, Rhodes and his partner Charles Rudd had officially incorporated De Beers Mining Company as De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. Rhodes and Rudd effectively controlled all diamond mining and production across the continent and in the spirit of the Robber Barons across the ocean in the United States began absorbing all elements of the industry – suppliers, distribution, marketing, and the like. A year later, the British government granted Rhodes a charter for the new British South Africa Company (BSAC) and allowed him to “develop” the area as he saw fit.

It’s telling that Rhodes managed to secure almost total authority over the region, including police powers, infrastructure, banking, and of course mining, despite substantial opposition within Parliament. He was one of those characters who simply seemed to always find a way. In this case, his strategy was one familiar to any good imperialist. What he couldn’t secure in the name of expansion or economic gain, he claimed in the cause of “protecting” the local populations from others interested in the same things. The motherland could find little reason to oppose the expansion of British influence, culture, and wealth, all funded by private interests at no cost to taxpayers. Any excesses were on the heads of the BSAC, while the benefits applied to all.

As Rhodes debated the best way to secure Matabeleland and Mashonaland, his worst instincts were on full display. He considered it unlikely the Ndebele (the inhabitants of those lands) would allow him or the British Empire to simply take over without a fight, but it was simply unacceptable to allow a few thousand “savages” to thwart the rightful expansion of white settlers and their superior way of life. He began making plans with several mercenaries on his payroll to raise a white militia which would support longtime local enemies of Lobengula in a presumably spontaneous, home-grown revolution against Lobengula. In classic western fashion, Rhodes’ forces would simply be supporting noble rebels against oppression, historic injustices, or whatever other justifications they might conjure – it didn’t really matter.

If they ended up ridding themselves of an inconvenient local obstacle in the process and taking control of his former kingdom in the name of security and protection of the little people remaining, well… so be it. Such was the white man’s burden.

Perhaps Logenbula could read the writing on the wall, or perhaps he made a strategic decision that cooperating with the British was once again his least horrible option. In any case, the entire scheme became unnecessary when Logenbula opened his doors willingly to Rhodes and BSAC development.

If Rhodes’ only concerns were financial, this should have been sufficient. Instead, he was determined to push the issue until the region was fully and truly transformed according to his own lofty visions. In 1890, Rhodes sent a “Pioneer Column” of 200 miners and nearly 500 armed militia (to “protect” them) into Mashonaland. If Lobengula’s forces resisted, Rhodes would finally have the war he’d been working for and an excuse to wipe out the Ndebele for good. If not, he knew it was safe to simply keep sending in whoever he wished, previous treaties or agreements be damned.

The Pioneer Column met no resistance and soon raised the British flag over their new settlement in Salisbury, officially claiming it for the British. When mining in the area proved less profitable than they’d hoped, Rhodes encouraged them to establish their own farms. If their intentions weren’t clear before, they certainly were now. The British weren’t merely enemies of the native Africans; they disdained them. Why fight someone when you can simply waltz in and take over without a fight?